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In 1991, the Supreme Court signalled a change in its
attitude toward the enforcement of agreements between
employers and individual employees to arbitrate statutory fair
employment practice claims. Although Gilmer v. Interstate
Johnson/Lane Corp. approved the arbitration of claims
arising under just one of the several existing fair employment
practice statutes, the rationale and result of Gilmer are likely
to apply to claims brought under other fair employment
practice statutes. This Article explores the potential impact of
the post-Gilmer proliferation of these employer-employee
agreements on the continued viability of the employment-at-
will doctrine.
Combining existing limitations on the employment-at-will
doctrine with employer-employee agreements to arbitrate
statutory fair employment practice claims will produce results
on two distinct levels. First, the authors identify those effects
resulting directly from the interaction of the at-will doctrine
with agreements to arbitrate-those flowing from the implied
covenant of good faith doctrine, the implied-in-
t Associate Professor of Law, Management, and Dispute Resolution, Babcock
Graduate School of Management, Wake Forest University. B.S., University of Evansville;
M.B.A., University of Arizona; J.D., Indiana University, Bloomington; Ph.D., University
of Iowa. Professor Hayford serves as Faculty Advisor to the J.D./M.B.A. program at
Wake Forest University and is a member of the National Academy of Arbitrators.
Research for this Article was funded in part by a grant from the Babcock Graduate School
of Management.
tt Associate, Dowd and Bloch, Chicago, Illinois; B.A., M.A., California State
University, Humboldt; J.D., Wake Forest University School of Law.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
fact/enforceable promises doctrine, and the public policy
exception to the employment-at-will doctrine.
The authors foresee a second level of interaction that may
ultimately have a profound impact on the discretion of at-will
employers. They posit that when arbitration of statutory fair
employment practice claims becomes commonplace,
employers will be obligated to arbitrate virtually all challenged
discharges of traditional protected-group members under an
emergent de facto just cause standard, a standard that will
greatly constrain the at-will employer's right to discharge
protected group members for reasons other than those
proscribed by statute. Moreover, employers may also be
compelled to arbitrate the discharges of nonprotected-group
members. Thus, by agreeing to arbitrate employee statutory
fair employment practice claims, employers may inadvertently
limit or surrender their remaining discretion under the
employment-at-will doctrine.
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I. INTRODUCTION
American employers are unique. Among the major developed
countries, only the United States permits private sector nonunionized
employers, not otherwise contractually constrained, to discharge
employees for virtually any reason or for no reason at all.' Instead
1. The United States is the only major industrialized democracy in which employees
do not enjoy some form of statutory workplace due process guarantee protecting them
from unfair or arbitrary termination of their employment. See Benjamin Aaron, Settlement
of Disputes Over Rights, in COMPARATIVE LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
260, 272-77 (R. Blanpain ed., 1982) (noting that "in the USA, unorganized workers have
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of a single statute that prohibits unjust dismissals, American
employers face a patchwork of statutory bars on certain types of
conduct deemed unacceptable because it discriminates against various
insular groups on the basis of race, color, national origin, gender,
religious beliefs and practices, disability, age, or other status.2
The employment-at-will doctrine (EAWD), which provides the
rationale for giving employers broad discretion to discharge employ-
ees, has served as the touchstone for the legal dimension of the
American employer-employee relationship for some one hundred
years. The thesis of this Article is that recent changes in the law of
commercial arbitration, and the concomitant move toward the
increased use of arbitration to resolve employer-employee disputes,
may, over time, render hollow this once impregnable and indispens-
able doctrine. This thesis springs from two potentially significant, but
previously unexplored, dimensions of the intersection between fair
less constitutional and statutory protection against economic risks and unfair treatment
than [do] workers in most industrialized nations"); William B. Gould IV, Job Security in
the United States: Some Reflections on Unfair Dismissal and Plant Closure Legislation from
a Comparative Perspective, 67 NEB. L. REv. 28, 29 (1988) (noting that while other
industrialized countries have unfair dismissal legislation to provide a measure of job
security to employees, dismissal of workers for principally disciplinary reasons remains a
contentious issue in American industrial relations); Karen Paull, Employment Termination
Reform: What Should a Statute Require Before Termination?-Lessons from the French,
British, and German Experiences, 14 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 619, 621 & n.7
(1991) (citing William B. Gould IV, Stemming the Wrongful Discharge Tide: A Case for
Arbitration, 13 EMPLOYEE REL. L.. 404, 408-09 (1987) (stating that the United States is
the only major industrialized nation without legislation limiting employer discretion in
dismissals)); Clyde W. Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Discharge: Time for
a Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481, 483-84, 508-19 (1976) (comparing American workers' legal
protections against unjust demands to remedies available in four Western European
nations); Note, Protecting Employees at Will Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public
Policy Exception, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1931, 1948 n.112 (1983) (noting that "the United
States is practically the only industrialized nation in the world that allows at will
dismissals," whereas sixty-five other nations protect employees with a just cause standard).
See generally WILLIAM J. HOLLOWAY & MICHAEL J. LEECH, EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION
RIGHTas AND REMEDIES, 252-55 (1985) (identifying judicial outrage at the injustice
engendered by the employment-at-will doctrine as contributing to the development of a
public policy exception to that doctrine).
2. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 255 (1964)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) makes it illegal for an employer
to discriminate on the basis of a person's race, color, national origin, sex or religion. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988). The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 [ADEA],
Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 607 (1967) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29
U.S.C.), protects persons over 40 years of age against employment discrimination because
of their age. 29 U.S.C. § 631 (1988). The Americans With Disabilities Act [ADA], Pub.
L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 331 (1990) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.), prohibits discrimination against "qualified individual[s] with a disability." 42
U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1988).
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employment practices (FEP) law and the EAWD as it arises within
the context of employer-employee agreements to arbitrate employee
statutory FEP claims.
The scholarly literature and management press are replete with
references to employers' concerns about the ubiquitous threat of law-
suits filed by employees who believe their discharges, demotions, lack
of career progress, or other unfavorable treatment are the result of
illegal employment discrimination.3  The Civil Rights Act of 19914
heightened these concerns by sanctioning the recovery of compen-
satory and punitive damages and guaranteeing the right to a jury trial
for plaintiffs who claim intentional acts of employment discrimi-
nation.5
3. See, e.g., COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS,
FACT FINDING REPORT 110 (1994) [hereinafter DUNLOP COMMISSION] ("During the two
decades from 1971 to 1991, the annual rate of employee suits against employers was five
times the number of twenty years earlier-and this was before the Americans With
Disabilities Act of 1990, the Civil Rights Act of 1991, and the Family and Medical Leave
Act of 1993 had come into effect."); Stuart H. Bompey & John D. Giansello, The Civil
Rights Act of 1991: An Analysis, in THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991: ITS IMPACT ON
EMPLOYMENTDISCRIMINATION LITIGATION 87,134 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course
Handbook Series No. 429, 1992) ("[E]mployers face an indeterminate risk that pending
litigation may become more complicated and expensive than originally anticipated and may
involve added risks of damages and liability earlier ruled out."); Donald C. Johnson, The
Civil Rights Act of 1991 and Disparate Impact: The Response to Factionalism, 47 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 469, 486 (1992) ("[T]he Rehnquist majority [in Ward's Cove Packing Co. v.
Antonio, 490 U.S. 642] expressed its concern that a liberal interpretation of Title VII
would lead employers to adopt racial quotas because of their fear of being haled into court
to defend business practices in expensive litigation."); Susan M. Mathews, Title VII and
Sexual Harassment: Beyond Damages Control, 3 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 299, 308 (1991)
("Employers are concerned that the addition of compensatory and/or punitive damages
to Title VII would result in dramatic increases in both the volume of litigation and the size
of awards."); see also JAMES N. DERTOUZOS ET AL., THE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
CONSEQUENCES OF WRONGFUL TERMINATION 4 (1988) (arguing that the judicially created
changes could, at the least, increase the volume of wrongful termination litigation); Todd
B. Carver & Albert A. Vondra, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Why It Doesn't Work and
Why It Does, HARV. Bus. REV., May-June 1994, at 120-30 (evaluating some of the
successes and failures of the alternative dispute resolution process); David A. Cathcart &
Mark Snyderman, The Civil Rights Act of 1991,8 LAB. LAw. 849,853 (1992) ("One widely
anticipated consequence of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 is an increase in employment
discrimination litigation under federal law."); John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The
Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983 (1991)
(arguing that among the changes in employment discrimination litigation is a dramatic
increase in volume and a shift toward challenging discrimination in discharge rather than
hiring).
4. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
5. With respect to damages, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981a(a), (b) (Supp. IV 1992)
(amending 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988)). Regarding the jury trial guarantee, see 42 U.S.C. §
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Anxiety over the costs, complexity, and consternation associated
with traditional civil litigation6 has propelled employers to search for
alternatives to litigation to achieve prompt, cost-effective, and
accurate resolutions of employees' statutory FEP claims.7 The use of
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) methods, especially binding
arbitration, significantly accelerated after the 1991 opinion of the
United States Supreme Court in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp.,' which expressly approved employer-employee agreements to
arbitrate statutory FEP claims.
Most commentary responding to Gilmer has concerned the
increased use of arbitration to resolve statutory FEP claims.' This
1981a(c) (Supp. IV 1992) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988)). Both the sanctions of
compensatory damages and punitive damages, as well as the jury trial guarantee, are
limited to plaintiffs in "disparate treatment" cases, wherein the employer is alleged to have
engaged in an intentional act of discrimination against an individual person or persons.
See also infra notes 229-30 and accompanying text.
6. See DUNLOP COMMISSION, supra note 3, at 108. The Commission observed:
Handling and resolving disputes under [traditional] law enforcement vehicles
requires considerable financial expenditures from employers, employees, and the
public. A conservative estimate is that for every dollar transferred in litigation
to a deserving claimant, another dollar must be expended on attorney fees and
other costs of handling both meritorious and nonmeritorious claims under the
legal program. Employers regularly spend much more than these direct costs of
litigation to develop new personnel practices, operational procedures and
equipment, and other measures to comply with the regulations.
Id. (citation omitted).
7. See Joseph T. McLaughlin & Karen M. Crupi, Alternative Dispute Resolution, in
C879 A.L.I.-A.B.A. COURSE OF STUDY: ARBITRATION, MEDIATION, AND OTHER ADR
METHODS 49, 87-91 (1993) (discussing the growing acceptance of alternative dispute
resolution for statutory claims); Peter M. Panken et al., Avoiding Employment Litigation:
Alternative Dispute Resolution of Employment Disputes in the 90"s, in C874 A.L.I.-A.B.A.
COURSE OF STUDY: ADVANCED EMPLOYMENT LAW AND LITIGATION 531,534-35 (1993);
Robert A. Shearer, The Impact of Employment Arbitration Agreements on Sex Discrimina-
tion Claims: The Trend Toward Non-Judicial Resolution, 18 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 479,485-
87 (1992-1993); Evan J. Spelfogel, New Trends in the Arbitration of Employment Disputes,
ARB. J., Mar. 1993, at 6-7; Susan R. Meredith, Using Fact Finders to Probe Workplace
Claims of Sexual Harassment, ARB. J., Dec. 1992, at 61.
8. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
9. See generally DOUGLAS S. MCDOWELL, EMPLOYMENT POLICY FOUNDATION,
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION TECHNIQUES: OPTIONS AND GUIDELINES TO MEET
YOUR COMPANY'S NEEDS (1993); Garry G. Mathiason & Nancy L. Ober, Preparing the
Workplace for the Twenty-First Century: Resolving Employment Discrimination Claims
Through Arbitration Agreements and Enforcing Private Settlement Agreements, in C780
A.LI.-A.B.A. COURSE OF STUDY: EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AND CIVIL RIGHTS
ACTIONS IN FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS 909, 919-34 (1993) (urging employers to
consult legal counsel before implementing an arbitration agreement and recommending
use of arbitration procedures promulgated by nationally-recognized organizations); Jay W.
Waks & Linda M. Gadsby, Employment Rights and Discrimination--Gilmer: Where We
Are and Where We Are Going, in SECURITIES ARBITRATION 1993: PRODUCTS, PROCE-
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Article seeks to move the dialogue beyond such threshold issues. It
addresses a critical question, not yet examined in the literature, that
will become apparent only when the arbitration of statutory FEP
claims becomes widespread among nonunionized employers: Can at-
will employers secure the purported benefits of arbitrating statutory
fair employment practices claims without inadvertently limiting-or
completely surrendering-the discretion they presently enjoy under
the EAWD? The answer lies in an evaluation of both the specific
and broader effects resulting from the interaction between the EAWD
and employer-employee agreements to arbitrate statutory FEP claims,
as will be described immediately below and analyzed in later portions
of this article.'0
As a foundation for the analysis, this Article first surveys the
changing law of employment arbitration and considers binding arbi-
tration as an appropriate device for adjudicating statutory FEP
claims." Next, this Article explores the origins and application of
the contemporary EAWD, with particular emphasis on the judicially
fashioned exceptions to the doctrine. 2 The Article will then detail
the specific, obvious effects of the interaction between the modem
EAWD and employer-employee agreements to arbitrate statutory
FEP claims,3 focusing on the interplay between the three primary
limitations on the modem EAWD (the implied covenant of good
faith, the implied-in-fact contract terms/enforceable promises doctrine,
DURES, AND CAUSES OF ACIoN, passim (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook
Series No. 820) (1993) (collecting cases); AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASS'N, RESOLVING
EMPLOYMENT DIsPuTEs-A MANUAL ON DRAFTING PROCEDURES, 1993 WL 495884
(1993) (offering the increasing number of employers who would like to introduce
alternative dispute resolution assistance in drafting appropriate procedures); Marshall W.
Grate, Binding Arbitration of Statutory Employment Discrimination Claims, 70 U. DET.
MERCY L. REv. 699 (1993) (exploring the Gilmer decision as a source of prospects for
expanding binding arbitration to include the adjudication of statutorily created rights);
Michael G. Holcomb, The Demise of the FAA's "Contract of Employment" Exception?
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 1992 J. DisP. RESOL. 213, 224-26 (arguing that
the Federal Arbitration Act is expanding to include more and more statutory claims and
that Gilmer undoubtedly will expand it into employment disputes); Martin H. Malin &
Robert F. Ladenson, Privatizing Justice: A Jurisprudential Perspective on Labor and
Employment Arbitration from the Steelworkers Trilogy to Gilmer, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1187
(1993) (addressing the concerns, policies, and rationale behind the increase in employment
arbitration); Frank C. Morris, Jr., Arbitration After Gilmer, 38 PRAC. LAw., June 1992, at
71,72 (reviewing the arbitration process and offering advice on how to handle employment
arbitration).
10. See infra notes 172-85 and accompanying text.
11. See infra part II.
12. See infra parts III & IV.
13. See infra part V.
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and the public policy exception) and employer efforts to formulate
and implement a binding arbitration device.
Subsequently, the Article discusses three broader results of the
interaction between the EAWD and FEP arbitration. 4 These
results, which will be referred to as the "broad interaction effects,"
are particularly significant because their impact will become apparent
only with the widespread use of arbitration as an alternative means
for adjudicating employee statutory FEP claims. The Article
illustrates how the EAWD/FEP interaction will, first, obligate at-will
employers to arbitrate virtually all challenged discharges of members
of traditionally protected groups;15 second, result in the imposition
of a de facto just cause standard that will greatly constrain the
discretion of at-will employers to discharge protected-group members
for illegitimate reasons not proscribed by the various FEP statutes;16
and third, impede the ability of at-will employers to refuse to arbitrate
the discharges of nonprotected-group members.' The Article
concludes with a look at the full scope of the ramifications for at-will
employers inherent in the decision to arbitrate statutory FEP
claims.'8
II. GILMER AND THE CHANGING LAW OF EMPLOYMENT
ARBITRATION
The central question in this inquiry was of little significance until
the Supreme Court's 1991 decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp.." Prior to Gilmer, the conventional wisdom was that the
federal judiciary would never deem arbitration a suitable surrogate for
judicial enforcement of statutory bars on employment discrimination.
That view was based on Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,2' a 1974
decision of the Supreme Court. In Gardner-Denver, the Court
considered whether a discharged African-American employee, whose
claim of illegal racial discrimination had been rejected under the
contractual binding arbitration mechanism, agreed to by his employer
and representative union,' nevertheless had a right to a trial de
14. See infra part VI.
15. See infra notes 204-23 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 224-55 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 256-94 and accompanying text.
18. See infra part VII.
19. 500 U.S. 20, 27 (1991)
20. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
21. Id. at 39-42. The arbitrator previously held that the plaintiff employee's discharge
was for just cause. Id. at 42. The arbitration award made no reference to the employee's
[Vol. 73
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novo under Title VII' Answering "yes" to that question,23 the
Supreme Court established a presumption that arbitration is not an
appropriate device for the final and binding adjudication of statute-
based FEP claims.
In so holding, the Supreme Court observed that "[a]rbitral
procedures, while well suited to the resolution of contractual disputes,
make arbitration a comparatively inappropriate forum for the final
resolution of rights created by Title VII."'24 Citing a number of
shortcomings in the arbitration process that it believed limited the
substantive and procedural rights afforded the claimant employee, the
Court characterized arbitration as "comparatively inferior to judicial
processes in the protection of Title VII rights."'  The Gardner-Den-
ver presumption that arbitration is an inferior and inappropriate
method for resolving Title VII (and other statutory FEP) claims
served as the touchstone for discussion of these matters for almost
twenty years.
Gilmer may signal a departure from Gardner-Denver. Unlike
Gardner-Denver, Gilmer involved an arbitration agreement between
an individual employee and his employer.26  Following his ter-
mination at age sixty-two, Robert Gilmer filed a charge with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission alleging that his
discharge violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA).27 When Gilmer subsequently brought suit in federal court,
the employer filed a motion to compel arbitration.' The district
court, relying on Gardner-Denver, denied the employer's motion.29
In affirming the reversal of the district court by the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court concluded that Gilmer "ha[d]
claim of racial discrimination. Id.
22. Id at 45.
23. Id. at 59-60.
24. Id. at 52.
25. Id. at 56-59. Among the shortcomings cited by the Court were the lack of
expertise of labor arbitrators with regard to statutory FEP matters, the less rigorous nature
of the arbitral fact-finding process, 'the absence of any requirement that arbitrators
articulate the reasons for their awards, and the informality of arbitral proceedings. Id.
26. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991). The agreement
to arbitrate was contained in a New York Stock Exchange registration application the
plaintiff employee was required to execute as a condition of his employment. That
arbitration agreement did not make specific reference to the arbitration of statutory FEP
claims. Id. Instead, it effectively obligated Gilmer and Interstate to "arbitrate any dispute,
claim or controversy" arising between them.
27. Id. at 23-24.
28. Id. at 24.
29. Id. at 35.
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not met his burden of showing that Congress, in enacting the ADEA,
intended to preclude arbitration of claims under that Act."'
Gilmore offers three reasons to doubt the viability of Gardner-
Denver. First, the specific result reached in Gilmer provides the first
reason for doubting the continued viability of the Gardner-Denver
presumption. The Court expressly held that arbitration of claims of
illegal age discrimination is not inconsistent with the ADEA,31 and
it affirmed a lower court order directing a recalcitrant plaintiff-
employee to proceed to final and binding arbitration of his statutory
FEP claim.3 More significant, however, is the apparent change in
the attitude of the Court regarding the general suitability of arbitra-
tion for adjudicating alleged violations of the statutory FEP rights of
individual employees under the ADEA, Title VII, the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA), and the remaining FEP statutes.
Second, the Court's commentary regarding Gilmer's challenges
to the adequacy of the procedural and substantive dimensions of arbi-
tration for adjudicating statutory FEP claims questions Gardner-
Denver. The Court stated:
[I]n our recent arbitration cases we have already rejected
most of these arguments as insufficient to preclude arbitra-
tion of statutory claims. Such generalized attacks on
arbitration "res[t] on suspicion of arbitration as a method of
weakening the protections afforded in the substantive law to
would-be complainants," and as such, they are "far out of
step with our current strong endorsement of the federal
statutes favoring this method of resolving disputes."'33
The Court also observed that: " 'So long as the prospective litigant
effectively may vindicate [his or her] statutory cause of action in the
arbitral forum, the [ADEA] will continue to serve both its remedial
and deterrent function[s].' "'
The third, arguably pivotal, dimension of Gilmer lies in the
Court's rejection of the argument that Gardner-Denver and its
progeny preclude final and binding arbitration of statutory FEP
claims. The key to the Court's refusal to follow the Gardner-Denver
result is in the distinction it drew between the arbitration of an
30. Id.
31. Id. at 27.
32. Id. at 35.
33. Id. at 30 (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S.
477, 481 (1989)).
34. Id. at 28 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473
U.S. 614, 637 (1985)).
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individual employee's statutory FEP claim under the terms of a
collective bargaining agreement and the arbitration of the same under
a separate contract between the employee and the employer, in which
the parties agree to arbitrate employment-related disputes?' The
Gilmer Court observed:
The Court in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. also ex-
pressed the view that arbitration was inferior to the judicial
process for resolving statutory claims. That "mistrust of the
arbitral process," however, has been undermined by our
recent arbitration decisions. "[W]e are well past the time
when judicial suspicion of the desirability of arbitration and
of the competence of arbitral tribunals inhibited the develop-
ment of arbitration as an alternative means of dispute
resolution.""5
Gilmer, therefore, signals a drastic shift in the Court's attitude toward
the arbitration of statutory FEP claims.
The explanation for that change in attitude is the Court's tacit
selection of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 7 rather than
national labor policy, as controlling the evaluation and enforcement
of individual employer-employee agreements to arbitrate statutory
FEP claims. By treating these as commercial arbitration agreements
subject to the FAA, rather than to labor policy, the Court freed itself
of the need to protect the interests of the individual employee whose
representative union has chosen to arbitrate his or her discrimination-
based employment claim under the collectively bargained arbitration
mechanism. Thus, the Court has begun synthesizing and developing
this dimension of employment dispute-resolution law as part of the
evolving body of commercial arbitration jurisprudence.
In Gilmer, the Supreme Court built upon its 1985 opinion in
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,8 its 1987
opinion in Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon,39 and its
1989 opinion in Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express,
Inc. 4 In those cases, the Court relied on the federal policy favoring
35. Id. at 33-35.
36. Id. at 34 n.5 (quoting Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220,
231-32 (1987); Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 626-27 (citations omitted)).
37. Id. at 33; see Federal Arbitration Act, ch. 1, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as
amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1988)).
38. 473 U.S. 614 (1985)
39. 482 U.S. 220 (1987)
40. 490 U.S. 477 (1989); Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26-35; see also supra notes 33-34, 36 and
accompanying text.
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arbitration, reflected in the FAA, to find enforceable contractual
arbitration provisions in disputes involving alleged violations of the
Sherman Act,4' the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
(RICO) Act,42 and the 1933 and 1934 Securities Acts.43 This body
of case law reversed the Court's long-standing position-dating back
to 1953-that arbitration was not an appropriate vehicle for resolving
statutory claims because of concerns pertaining to the ability of
arbitrators adequately to enforce complex statutory schemes."4 The
general rule regarding the enforcement of contractual agreements to
arbitrate statutory claims that emerges from the Mitsubishi line of
cases, as re-emphasized in the context of statutory FEP claims in
Gilmer, is clear. Unless the party attempting to resist arbitration can
prove Congress intended under the statute at issue to preclude
potential complainants from waiving the judicial forum and agreeing
to arbitrate their statutory claims, voluntary a priori agreements to
that effect will be enforced by the federal courts.45
Gilmer is a watershed case. Since it was handed down, four
circuit courts of appeals have enforced contractual agreements
between individual employees and their employers to compel the
arbitration of an employee's Title VII charges.46 In addition, the
Ninth Circuit held that an employee's claim of an employer violation
41. Sherman Anti-Trust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C §§ 1-7 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
42. P.L. No. 91-45, Title IX, 84 Stat. 941 (1970) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1961-1968 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
43. Securities Act of 1934, ch. 38, Title I, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1988 & Supp. V 1993)); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48
Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 99 78a-111 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
44. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 434-38 (1953).
45. Gilmer v. Interstate Johnson/Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (citing Shear-
son/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 227 (1987)); see also Mago v.
Shearson Lehman Hutton Inc., 956 F.2d 932, 935 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting McMahon, 482
U.S. at 227); Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 905 F.2d 104, 105-06 (5th Cir. 1990),
vacated, 500 U.S. 930, remanded, 939 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1991), affd, 975 F.2d 1161 (5th Cir.
1992). But see Borenstein v. Tucker, 757 F. Supp. 3 (D. Conn. 1991) (holding that an
employee could not be bound to a contractual agreement with the employer to arbitrate
ADEA and Title VII claims absent a showing that Congress intended to allow employees
prospectively to waive their judicial remedies).
46. See Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 975 F.2d 1161 (5th Cir. 1992); Bender
v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 971 F.2d 698,700 (11th Cir. 1992); Mago, 956 F.2d at 932;
Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305, 307 (6th Cir. 1991). Alford is
particularly significant since it was the product of the Supreme Court's post-Gilmer
reversal and remand of the Fifth Circuit's 1990 decision, Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc., 905 F.2d 104, 105-06, which had relied on Gardner-Denver to hold a Title VII dispute
an improper subject for arbitration under a contractual arbitration agreement. See Alford,
975 F.2d at 1162.
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of the Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 199047 was subject to
arbitration under the same type of contractual agreement at issue in
Gilmer.48 Significantly, the D.C. Circuit recently held that nothing
in the Civil Rights Act of 199141 suggests that Congress intended to
modify or undermine the rule of Gilmer."
Given the resonant nature of the Supreme Court's endorsement
of the arbitration of statutory FEP claims as articulated in Gilmer,
there is every reason to believe that the above-framed general
rule-that agreements to arbitrate statutory claims are enforceable,
absent proof of contrary congressional intent-will also control in the
sphere of employment dispute resolution.5' This inference is further
supported by the congressional endorsement of arbitration and other
ADR devices in the Civil Rights Act of 199152 and the ADA, 3
47. The Employee Polygraph Protection Act (EPPA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2009 (1988).
48. Saari v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 968 F.2d 877, 882 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 494 (1992).
49. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (effective November 21, 1991) (codified in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
50. Benefits Communications Corp. v. Klieforth, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 122,
126-27 (D.C. Cir. 1994) ("[Tlhe language of the statute in no way suggests that the rule
of Gilmer should no longer apply.").
51. Because it is not central to the primary inquiry of this article, Gilmer will not be
analyzed further. It should be noted, however, that there are two primary questions
remaining as to Gilmer's reach. The first goes to the scope of the § 1 FAA exemption for
"contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." See 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1988). The second goes to
the manner in which Gilmer will be reconciled with Gardner-Denver. See Stephen L.
Hayford, The Coming of the Third Era of Labor Arbitration, ARB. J., Sept. 1993, at 12-15.
52. Section 118 of the Act provides:
Where appropriate and to the extent authorized by law, the use of alternative
means of dispute resolution, including settlement negotiations, conciliation,
facilitation, mediation, factfinding, minitrials, and arbitration, is encouraged to
resolve disputes arising under the Acts or provisions of Federal law amended by
this title [enacting section 1981a of Title 41, The Public Health and Welfare, and
section 601 of Title 2, The Congress; amending sections 1981, 1988, 2000e,
2000e-1, 2000e-2, 2000e-4, 2000e- 5, 2000e-16, 12111 and 1211.2 of Title 42, and
section 626 of Title 29, Labor, and enacting provisions set out as notes under
sections 1981, 2000e, and 2000e-4 of Title 42].
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 118, 105 Stat. 1071, 1081 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1981 (note) (Supp. IV 1992).
53. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327
(codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (Supp. IV 1992)). Section 513 states: "Where
appropriate and to the extent authorized by law, the use of alternative means of dispute
resolution, including settlement negotiations, conciliation, facilitation, mediation,
factfinding, minitrials, and arbitration, is encouraged to resolve disputes arising under this
chapter." Pub. L. No. 101-336, Title V, § 513, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 12212 (Supp. IV 1992)).
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which was enacted in 1990 .54
If, over time, Gilmer proves to be the harbinger of widespread
arbitration of statutory FEP claims, the ramifications for at-will
employers and their employees could be profound. Thorough analysis
requires, initially, an exploration of the origins of the contemporary
employment-at-will doctrine.
III. THE ORIGINS OF THE CONTEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT-AT-
WILL DOcrRNE (EAWD)
To understand the nature of a modem employer's freedom to
terminate employees at will, it is necessary to differentiate employer
conduct that may be morally repugnant or unfair from that which is
illegal and therefore subject to reversal. The EAWD provides the
device for distinguishing between legal and illegal terminations in that
area of the employment relationship which is not affected by the
several statutory and Constitutional bars on employment
discrimination. The remainder of this section reviews the origins and
early evolution of the EAWD.
54. That the endorsement by Congress of the arbitration device may be less than
unequivocal is indicated by the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act (OWBPA)
amendment of § 7 of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). Older
Workers Benefit Protection Act of 1990, [hereinafter OWBPA] Pub. L. No. 101-433, §
201(f)(1), 104 Stat. 978, 983-84 (1990) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 626(0 (Supp.
IV 1992)); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, § 7, 81
Stat. 604 (1967) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
The OWBPA amends § 7 of the ADEA by establishing that any waiver of a right or claim
by an ADEA protected-group member must be "knowing and voluntary." OWBPA, §
201(f)(1), 104 Stat. at 983. It then sets down eight indicators of a "knowing and voluntary"
waiver. OWBPA, § 201(0(1), 104 Stat. at 983-84. Most significant is the stipulation that
"the individual does not waive rights or claims that may arise after the date the waiver is
executed." OWBPA, § 201(f)(1), 104 Stat. at 983.
Whether this final provision was intended by Congress to bar employer-employee
agreements prospectively to arbitrate future ADEA claims remains to be determined.
That the Supreme Court does not read the cited section of the OWBPA as a bar to the
widespread arbitration of statutory FEP claims under otherwise valid employer-employee
agreements to arbitrate is indicated by its discussion of § 201 of the Act in Gilmer, 500
U.S. at 28-29 n.3 ("[If Congress intended the substantive protection afforded [by the
ADEA] to include protection against waiver of the right to a judicial forum, that intention
will be deducible from text or legislative history" (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985))). Because it denied the attempt
by the claimant employee in Gilmer to avoid arbitration, it can be inferred that the Court
found no such basis for deduction in the text or the legislative history of the OWBPA.
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A. Wood's Rule-Lodestar of the Employment-At-Will Doctrine
Most scholars credit the earliest formulation of the American
EAWD to Horace Gray Wood. Wood's writing originated near the
peak of the Industrial Revolution,55 during an intense split between
American and English jurisprudence over the basic legal character of
the employer-employee relationship. In the British tradition, an
employment contract lacking a fixed duration was presumed to be for
one year. 6 In America, rapid industrialization and commercial
expansion generated economic pressure for more flexibility in the
employment relationship. The English one-year presumption came
under fire in America, and a transatlantic controversy between legal
scholars ensued.'
Wood articulated a clear, uncomplicated rule, well suited to the
needs of American industrialists, that also comported with the laissez
faire school of thought that dominated American economic public
policy during the late nineteenth century5 The legal scholarship
that led to Wood's formulation of the American "rule" for the
presumed duration of employment with no fixed term was long ago
discredited. 9 Nevertheless, in nineteenth century unerica, Wood's
Rule quickly gained widespread acceptance and soon supplanted the
English presumption. Wood wrote:
55. 2 H.G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT § 134 (2d
ed. 1886).
56. Mary A. Bedikian, Transforming At-Will Employment Disputes Into Wrongful
Discharge Claims: Fertile Ground for ADR, 1993 J. DisP. RESOL. 113, 117.
57. See Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM.
J. LEGAL HIST. 118, 118-19 (1976); Sanford M. Jacoby, The Duration of Indefinite
Employment Contracts in the United States and England: An Historical Analysis, 5 COMP.
LAB. LU. 85, 91-111 (1982).
58. See CARL B. SWISHER, AMERICAN CONSTITUrIONAL DEVELOPMENT 329, 393
(1954); Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE
L. 1013, 1053 (1984); Max Lemer, The Supreme Court and American Capitalism, 42
YALE L.. 668, 672 (1933)); Arthur S. Miller, Toward a Definition of "the" Constitution,
8 U. DAYTON L. REV. 633,647 (1983); G. Richard Shell, Contracts in the Modern Supreme
Court, 81 CAL. L. REV. 431, 490 n.367 (1993) (citing KEVIN M. TEEEN, A HISTORY OF
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMON LAW OF CoNTRACr 291 (1990)).
59. For the proposition that Wood's Rule was based on defective or inferior legal
scholarship, see Feinman, supra note 57, at 126; Murray Tabb, Employee Innocence and
the Privileges of Power: Reappraisal of Implied Contract Rights, 52 Mo. L. REv. 803, 804
n.2 (1987) (citing Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880, 886-87 & nn.
13-14 (Mich. 1980)); Note, Protecting Employees at Will Against Wrongful Discharge: The
Public Policy Exception, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1931, 1933 (1983); J. Peter Shapiro & James
F. Tune, Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L. REV. 335, 341-45
(1974).
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A general or indefinite hiring is prima facie a hiring at will,
and if the servant seeks to make it out a yearly hiring, the
burden is upon him to establish it by proof. A hiring at so
much a day, week, month, or year, no time being specified,
is an indefinite hiring, and no presumption attaches that it
was for a day even, but only at the rate fixed for whatever
time the party may serve. It is competent for either party to
show what the mutual understanding of the parties was in
reference to the matter; but unless their understanding was
mutual that the service was to extend for a certain fixed and
definite period, it is an indefinite hiring and is terminable at
the will of either party.6'
B. The Effect of Wood's Rule
By providing employers with a free hand in dealing with the
labor component of the manufacturing process, uncomplicated by
concerns of fair treatment and due process, Wood's Rule served well
the imperatives of rapid industrialization and the fluctuating economic
cycles that accompanied it. The Rule also enjoyed the advantage of
harmony with a fundamental principle of contract law-mutuality of
obligation.6' For example, because a cigar-maker was deemed, as a
matter of law (though seldom true practically), free to walk away
from his job at any time, for any or no reason, the cigar-maker's
employer was also deemed, as a matter of law, free to discharge the
employee at any time for any or no reason.62
The flaw in Wood's Rule and in the mutuality of obligation
corollary, which became more apparent as the Industrial Revolution
matured, was the failure to account for the employer's increasingly
superior economic strength. It is unlikely that at the turn of the
century, the typical underpaid, low-skilled, unorganized worker found
any substantial comfort in his freedom to walk off the job. In theory,
the EAWD offered employers and employees bilateral flexibility. In
reality, in an oversupplied labor market teeming with cheap immi-
grant labor, the EAWD dealt workers a generous helping of hardship,
abuses, and exploitation.
60. WOOD, supra note 55, at 283.
61. This principle provides that unless both parties are bound to the contract, neither
is. See, e.g., JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 4-
12(c)(2) (3d ed. 1987).
62. Bedikian, supra note 56, at 117 n.15 (reporting that the earliest expression of this




In 1908, the United States Supreme Court squarely endorsed the
EAWD in Adair v. United States.6' The Court upheld a constitution-
al challenge to a federal law that barred railroad employers from
discharging employees because of union membership,' 4 finding in the
statute an impermissible interference with the "liberty to contract"
protected by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion.6' Justice Harlan, writing for the Court, observed:
The right of a person to sell his labor upon such terms as he
deems proper is, in its essence, the same as the right of the
purchaser of labor to prescribe the conditions upon which he
will accept such labor from the person offering to sell it. So
the right of the employ[ee] to quit the service of the
employer, for whatever reason, is the same as the right of
the employer, for whatever reason, to dispense with the
services of such employ[ee].'
Though the Court eventually recognized the power of Congress to
protect the right of employees to join, form, and organize labor
unions,67 it never has per se repudiated the EAWD.
The failure of Wood's Rule and the EAWD to account for the
realities of the employer-employee relationship in an industrialized
society eventually helped to propel Congress to restrike the power
balance between employers and employees. More recently, the state
courts in most jurisdictions have subjected the EAW2VD to a number
of caveats.' Nevertheless, Wood's Rule remains at the core of
American employment jurisprudence. Except in Montana, where the
EAWD has been repudiated by statute,69 it remains a valid, albeit
evolving, legal principle throughout the United States. The evolution
of Wood's one-dimensional rule into today's EAWD is the subject of
the section below.
IV. THE MODERN EAWD RULE
The modem EAWD provides that, absent a legal rule to the
contrary, either party to an employment relationship for an indefinite
(unspecified) term can terminate the relationship at will, despite the
employee's length of service, with or without cause or notice, and
63. 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
64. See Erdman Act of 1898, ch. 370, 30 Stat. 424 (1898).
65. Adair, 208 U.S. at 175, 180.
66. Id at 174-75.
67. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 29-32 (1937).
68. See infra notes 115-76 and accompanying text.
69. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to -903 (1993).
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without giving any explanation or reason, unless the freedom to
terminate is constrained by contract." Conversely, where employ-
ment is for a definite term based on a contract, an employer can
terminate only for cause.7' This general conceptualization of the
EAWD notwithstanding, the modem rule recognizes that the
employer's freedom to terminate at will can be, and often is,
restrained by statutory employment standards or limitations of the
common law.
A. Legislative Limitations on the Modern EAWD
Successful legislative attempts to cabin the EAWD doctrine are
a relatively recent phenomenon. Between the last half of the
nineteenth century and the 1930s New Deal era, the Supreme Court
was markedly hostile to efforts by state legislatures and Congress in
this area.72 As one commentator observed, "the justices' special
wrath was reserved for laws that interfered with employer-employee
relationships."'73 The Court routinely held that statutes regulating
employment unconstitutionally interfered with the freedom to contract
and with economic liberty as then perceived to be strongly protected
by the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.74 These cases were decided by the Court as if there
were an express article in the Constitution effectuating the laissez-
faire concept, thereby precluding the legislative imposition of any
form of restraint on the free labor market mechanism.75
Three years before its endorsement of the EAWD in Adair v.
United States,76 the Supreme Court invalidated a state law limiting
the maximum work hours of New York's bakers to sixty hours a week
or ten hours a day.' In Lochner v. New York, the Court held that
the law interfered with the "freedom of master and employee to
contract with each other in relation to their employment" and violated
the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due process." An
70. 30 CJ.S. Employer-Employee Relationship § 40 (1992).
71. See E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 8.15 (2d ed. 1990) (discussing how and
when employee conduct constituting cause for discharge warrants termination of
contractual relations).
72. JoHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, §§ 11.2-11.3 (4th ed. 1991).
73. Id. § 4.6.
74. Id. § 11.3; see also infra notes 76-88 and accompanying text.
75. NOWAK ET AL., supra note 72, § 11.4.
76. 208 U.S. 161 (1908); see also supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
77. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 46-47 (1905).
78. Id. at 64.
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exasperated Oliver Wendell Holmes noted in dissent that the
Constitution did not command adherence to Herbert Spencer's (lais-
sez-faire) economic theories.79 It would be some time before the
spirit of Holmes's observation took root.
In 1908, the same year Adair was decided, the Supreme Court
began what would prove to be a pattern lasting more than two
decades of applying the antitrust laws to enjoin strikes by employees
and other forms of concerted union-related activity.'° In 1915, in
Hammer v. Dagenhart,8 ' the Court struck down a federal statute
barring the interstate shipment of products from mining operations
that employed child labor, holding that Congress had exceeded its
authority under the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution.' In
Coppage v. Kansas,' the Court affirmed a lower federal court deci-
sion striking down a Kansas statute' prohibiting employers from
extracting from employees, as a condition of employment, an anti-
union "yellow dog"" promise.86  The Court reasoned that the
79. Justice Holmes wrote:
This case is decided upon an economic theory which a large part of the country
does not entertain. If it were a question whether I agreed with that theory, I
should desire to study it further and long before making up my mind. But I do
not conceive that to be my duty, because I strongly believe that my agreement
or disagreement has nothing to do with the right of a majority to embody their
opinions in law. It is settled by various decisions of this court that state
constitutions and state laws may regulate life in many waits which we as
legislators might think as injudicious or if you like as tyrannical as this, and
which, equally with this, interfere with the liberty to contract. Sunday laws and
usury laws are ancient examples. A more modem one is the prohibition of
lotteries. The liberty of the citizen to do as he likes so long as he does not
interfere with the liberty of others to do the same, which has been a shibboleth
for some well-known writers, is interfered with by school laws, by the Post Office,
by every state or municipal institution which takes his money for purposes
thought desirable, whether he likes it or not. The Fourteenth Amendment does
not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics.
Id. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
80. See Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908) (the Danbury Hatters Case). The use
by federal courts of the injunction and antitrust theory to frustrate organized labor led
ultimately to a sweeping Congressional restriction on the jurisdiction of federal courts in
labor disputes. See Norris-LaGuardia Act §§ 1-15,29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1988) (limiting
federal judicial power to issue such injunctions).
81. 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
82. Id at 276-77 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8).
83. 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
84. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 4674, 4675 (1909) (approved during 1903 as Chapter 222 of
the Session Laws of that year).
85. A "yellow dog" agreement is a contract by which an employee promises not to
join a union and agrees that discharge will result if he or she does. BLACK's LAW
DICTIONARY 1616 (6th ed. 1990).
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statute infringed on property and liberty rights without due process of
law, contrary to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.' In 1923, in Adkins v. Children's Hospital' the Court
invalidated a minimum wage law for women working in the District
of Columbia, holding that "freedom to contract is... the general rule
and restraint the exception." 9
Holmes's Lochner dissent, which argued that the Court had no
business weighing the economic merits of legislative promulgations
affecting commerce, slowly gained recognition. By the 1930s, the
Supreme court, undoubtedly motivated by President Roosevelt's
threat to "pack" the Court with Justices who would view his "New
Deal" legislative agenda favorably," began to abandon its hostility
to legislative encroachments into the realm of commerce.
In 1934, in Nebbia v. New York, the Court upheld a state statute
establishing certain standards for milk products.91 The decision
heralded the Court's increased willingness to defer to legislative
decisions in economic matters. In employment matters, the change in
the Court's attitude first was signaled by West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish,' in which it overruled Adkins by approving a state
minimum wage law. The Court noted that "[t]he Constitution does
not speak of freedom of contract,"'93 and flatly stated "regulation[s]
which [are] reasonable in relation to [their] subject and.., adopted
in the interests of community" satisfy the requirements of due
process.94 Thus, by the late 1930s the "liberty to contract" bar to
legislative limitation of the EAWD had lost its vitality, clearing the
path to legislative action.
Still, the United States chose a legislative path different from
other industrialized democracies. As noted earlier, the United States
is the only major developed country in which employees do not enjoy
some form of statutory workplace due process guarantee against
unfair or arbitrary termination of their employment. 5 Instead, in
recent years our legislators have chosen to enact a number of more
86. Coppage, 236 U.S. at 26.
87. Id.
88. 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
89. Id. at 546.
90. NOWAK, supra note 72, § 11.3.
91. 291 U.S. 502, 538-39 (1934).
92. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
93. Id. at 391.
94. Id.
95. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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narrowly drawn statutory bars to unequal treatment (including
discharge) based on a person's race, color, sex, national origin,
religion, age, disability, or union-related activity.
The first of those proscriptions was set forth in the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA),16 enacted in 1935. Section 8(a)(3) of
the NLRA bars private-sector employers from discriminating against
employees (or applicants for employment) on the basis of their union
activity or affiliation.' Section 8(a)(3) effectively prevents employ-
ers from exercising their EAWD prerogatives to discharge workers
who seek to form, join, or assist unions.
The Court's approval of the NLRA in 193798 elidenced its new-
found receptivity to legislative intervention in the employment
relationship. Moreover, it demonstrated that the traditional EAWD
was no longer immune to challenge or limitation. The Court and
Congress still clash occasionally over the scope and content of
employment regulations.99 Nevertheless, for nearly sixty years the
Court has been consistently willing to allow legislatures to tacitly
reshape or restrict the EAWD in the pursuit of various social policy
objectives.
Today, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 effectively
precludes at-will employers from terminating employees based on
their race, color, national origin, sex, or religion.' ° The ADA,0 '
96. National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (Wagner Act), ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935)
(current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1988)).
97. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1988).
98. See NRLB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937).
99. Thus, for example, in Ward's Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), a
group of salmon cannery workers brought a disparate impact, pattern, or practice of
discrimination suit alleging employment discrimination on the basis of race. Id. at 646-48.
The Supreme Court held that statistical evidence showing a high percentage of nonwhite
workers in the cannery and a low percentage of nonwhites in the noncannery (mostly
skilled) positions did not establish a prima facie case of disparate impact in violation of
Title VII. Id. at 650-55. Congress believed that Ward's Cove had resulted in an improper
alteration of the framework for analyzing Title VII disparate impact cases first articulated
by the Court in Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424, 429-36 (1971). Consequently, it
expressly reversed Ward's Cove by enacting section 105 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
thereby restoring the Griggs framework for analyzing disparate impact claims. Civil Rights
Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105, 105 Stat. 1071, 1074-76 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§
1981, 2000e-2(k) to -2(n) (Supp. IV 1992)).
100. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a), 2000e-3(a) (1988) prohibit discharge "because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin," or as retaliation for activities
authorized by the Act, including filing charges, testifying, and opposing unfair practices.
A presidential executive order redoubles the Title VII statutory bar on these types of
employment discrimination for private sector firms who contract with the federal
government. Exec. Order No. 11246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1965), reprinted as amended in 42
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in concert with the Vocational Rehabilitation Act,1" similarly pro-
tects qualified individuals with disabilities. The ADEA 13 effectively
prohibits age-based discharges of workers age 40 and over.104
In the same manner, the Fair Labor Standards Act,"S which
imposes minimum standards for wages and hours,1 6 the Occupation-
al Safety and Health Act of 197 0,"c7 which imposes standards for
worker safety and protects workers from unreasonable risk of injury
or death,"°' and the Equal Pay Act of 1963,"° which proscribes
gender-based wage discrimination," all prevent employers from
discharging employees in retaliation for exercising or enforcing their
statutory rights. Subject to limited exceptions, the Employee
Polygraph Protection Act of 1988111 protects employees from
discharge for refusing to submit to a polygraph examination.
Although not a substantive bar to termination, the Worker Adjust-
ment and Retraining Notification Act 2 requires subject employers
to give workers advance notice of plant closings and related layoffs
before terminating the employment relationship."1 These congres-
sional initiatives have incrementally restricted employers' discretion
to terminate at will. State and municipal legislatures also have
enacted an array of statutes and ordinances that parallel and
supplement the protections provided by federal law.1 4
U.S.C. § 2000e (1988).
101. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. IV 1992).
102. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701,791-794 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
103. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1988 & Supp. V
1993).
104. Id §§ 621, 623(a), (d) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
105. Id §§ 201-219 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
106. Id. § 215(a)(3) (1988).
107. Id. §§ 651-678 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
108. Id. § 660(c)(1) (1988).
109. Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
110. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1988).
111. See supra note 47. Under the EPPA, workers in the security industry and workers
who manufacture, distribute or dispense drugs are exempted from the protection. 29
U.S.C. §§ 2002, 2006, 2007 (1988).
112. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109 (1988).
113. Id. § 2102(a) (1988).
114. See, e.g., CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 1101, 1102 (West 1988 & Supp. 1994) (prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and perceived sexual orientation); N.Y.
LABOR LAW § 201 (1993) (barring discrimination based on employees' political activity,
lawful use of consumable products, and legal recreational activity); TOPEKA, KAN., CODE
§ 22-99 (1985) (physical handicap); see also Faipeas v. Municipality of Anchorage, 860 P.2d
1214 (Alaska 1993) (involving litigation over a city ordinance, ANCHORAGE MUNICIPAL
ORDINANCE 92-116(S) (1993), that prohibited discrimination in public employment on the
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B. Judicially Created Exceptions and Caveats to the Modern
EAWD
Judges, sitting at common law without the benefit of specific
statutory directives, have been as active as legislators in transforming
the EAWD. In recent years, state courts have subjected Wood's Rule
to a number of judicially created exceptions and caveats. American
courts have used both contract and tort theory to confine the reach
of the EAWD. Actions of this variety based on contract law center
on two legal constructs: the implied covenant of good faith, and the
implied-in-fact contract terms and enforceable promises doctrine.
Both relate to implicit, mutual duties imposed on the parties by the
employment relationship. The primary tort cause of action centers on
terminations alleged to be contrary to public policy. Courts in forty-
five states have utilized one or more of these three exceptions to limit
the discretion of at-will employers to terminate employees. 5
1. The Contract Theory-Based Exceptions to the EAWD
The EAWD notwithstanding, employers and employees remain
free to contract, either expressly or impliedly, for a fixed term. 6
Thus, an employer can contract with an employee for a fixed term, or
stipulate contractually that the employee will be terminated only for
just cause, thereby expressly surrendering its freedom to discharge at
will. 7 However, employers that hope to retain the freedom to
basis of an individual's sexual orientation); Federated Rural Elec. Ins. Co. v. Kessler, 388
N.W.2d 553,553 n.1, 562 (Wis. 1986) (involving a Madison, Wisconsin city ordinance which
provided in part that "[i]t shall be an unfair discrimination practice and unlawful and
hereby prohibited... [flor any person or employer ... to discharge any individual ...
because of such individual's... marital status," where marital status "shall include being
married, separated, divorced, widowed, or single" MADISON, WiS. GEN. ORDINANCES §
3.23 (1975)).
115. DUNLOP COMMISSION, supra note 3, at 107.
116. Michael J. Phillips, Toward a Middle Way in the Polarized Debate Over
Employment At Will, 30 AM. Bus. LI. 441, 443 n.10 (1992) (citing Larry S. Larson, Why
We Should Not Abandon the Presumption That Employment is Terminable at Will, 23
IDAHO L. REv. 219, 221-24 (1986-87)); see also Hodge v. Evans Fin. Corp., 823 F.2d 559,
562 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that oral contract for permanent employment was not
unenforceable under the District of Columbia's statute of frauds); Paolucci v. Adult
Retardates Ctr., Inc., 582 N.Y.S.2d 452, 453 (1992) (holding that a contractual limitation
on an employer's right to terminate an at-will employee will not be inferred absent an
express agreement to that effect relied on by employee).
117. See, e.g., Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 628 (Minn. 1983)
(opining that the converse to the employment-at-will rule is that when a contract of
employment states a definite duration, dismissal only for cause is presumed); Stiver v.
Texas Instruments, Inc., 750 S.W.2d 843, 846 (Tex. App. 1988) (holding that cause of
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discharge employees at will, either by refusing to enter into fixed-term
or just-cause contracts or by conditioning their agreement to a fixed-
term employment contract on the omission of any terms limiting their
at-will discretion, can be frustrated in that effort.
a. Implied-in-Law Contract Theory: The Covenant of Good
Faith
In certain circumstances, courts in some states are willing to read
an implied covenant (or duty) of good faith and fair dealing into
employment contracts-whether express or implied, written or
oral-that on their face appear to preserve the employer's at-will
authority."8 Those courts award damages to employees terminated
in breach of the implied covenant, despite the express or apparent
action for breach of an employment contract requires the plaintiff to show the existence
of a written contract specifically and directly limiting the employer's right to terminate at
will); see also Newfield v. Insurance Co. of the West, 203 Cal. Rptr. 9,12-13 (Cal. Ct. App.
1984) (finding no wrongful discharge because employee failed to show an express or
implied contract for permanent employment, so general rule that employment contract is
terminable at will applies); Konitzer v. Carpenter, No. C.A. 92C-07-067, LEXIS 458, at
*22-24 (Del. Super. App. Div. Dec. 29, 1993) (holding that, in spite of employee's at-will
status, an employer may be estopped from firing the employee if employee has
detrimentally relied upon employer's promises of permanent employment); cf Vajda v.
Arthur Anderson & Co., 624 N.E.2d 1343, 1347 (Ill. App. 1993) (observing that the at-will
rule imports a presumption that a hiring without a fixed term is a hiring at will) (citations
omitted); Speece v. Universal Pensions, Inc., No. 62444, LEXIS 2624, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App.
May 20, 1993) (ruling that in the absence of an employment agreement for a fixed term,
the employment relationship is considered at-will; the employee may leave the employer
and the employer may discharge the employee at any time without cause) (citing Rogers
v. Target Telemarketing Servs., 591 N.E.2d 1332 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990)).
118. See, e.g., Walker v. Blue Cross of Cal., 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 184, 189 (Cal. Ct. App.
1992) (determining, in suit against former employer for alleged breach of contract and
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, that a triable issue of fact
existed as to whether there was an implied-in-fact promise not to terminate except for
good cause); Mannix v. Butte Water Co., 854 P.2d 834, 845-46 (Mont. 1993) (stating that
whether the covenant of good faith and fair dealing "is implied in a particular case
depends upon the objective manifestations by the employer giving rise to an employee's
reasonable belief that he or she has job security and will be treated fairly" (citing Dare v.
Montana Petroleum Mktg. Co., 687 P.2d 1015,1020 (Mont. 1984))); Somers v. Somers, 613
A.2d 1211, 1213 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (holding that the duty to perform contractual
obligations in good faith applies to employment contract of at-will employee); Hooks v.
Gibson, 842 S.W.2d 625, 628 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992) (applying duty of good faith and fair
dealing to employment contracts); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Portilla, 836 S.W.2d
664 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992). In Goodyear, the court considered testimony from the
plaintiff's managers and supervisors that they had assured plaintiff during her 22-year
tenure that she would have a job as long as she was doing good work. Id. at 669. The
court found this was evidence of more than mere compliments; it created a jury question
as to whether the employer modified the at-will employment contract by agreeing that the
plaintiff would not be discharged except for good cause. Id.
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terms of the employment contract permitting termination at will." 9
Thus, the covenant of good faith is said to be "irnplied-in-law."'' 2
It is a condition grafted onto the relationship between an employer
and employee by force of reason or judicial doctrine in order to
prevent a termination resulting from perceived untoward or unfair
conduct or oppression by the employer.
The implied covenant of good faith is a product of section 205 of
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, which states that "[e]very
contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing
in its performance and its enforcement.'' The covenant obligates
each party to a contract to avoid maliciously harmimg the other, or
compromising the other's receipt of the benefit of the contract."
By requiring the employer to adhere to basic precepts of procedural
and substantive due process, the implied covenant of good faith
interjects a tacit term into the employment relationship that effective-
ly bars at least certain types of overtly pernicious employer conduct
(including discharge) that offends general notions of fair play and
119. At times a breach of this covenant has been viewed as warranting the recovery of
tort damages as well as contract damages. See, e.g., Clearly v. American Airlines, Inc., 168
Cal. Rptr. 722 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980). The clear trend is away from this duty. Foley v.
Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 401 (Cal. 1988) (abolishing the tort cause of action
and returning the breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing to the
realm of contract law). In Foley, the court held that only contract damages were available
to plaintiffs proving breach. Id. The court observed further that "the clear majority of
jurisdictions have either expressly rejected the notion of tort damages for breach of the
implied covenant [of good faith] in employment cases or [have] impliedly done so by
rejecting any application of the covenant in such a context." Id. at 391; accord Fortune
v. National Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1256 (Mass. 1977); Monge v. Beebe
Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549,551-52 (N.H. 1974); cf K Mart Corp. v. Ponsock, 732 P.2d 1364,
1370 (Nev. 1987) (ruling that only in the "rare and exceptional cases" where there exists
a "special relationship" between the plaintiff employee and the employer is the contractual
relationship of a nature to give rise to a duty warranting tort damages) (quoted in Wilder
v. Cody Country Chamber of Commerce, 868 P.2d 211, 221 (Wyo. 1994) which held that
"[tlhe special relationship necessary to permit recovery [of tort damages] is not established
merely by the employer-employee relationship. A showing is required that a special
relationship of trust and reliance exists between the particular employee seeking recovery
and the employer.").
120. Caplan v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 233 Cal. Rptr. 901, 905 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
121. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981).
122. See Clearly, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729 (holding that termination of employment without
legal cause after the employee completed 18 years of apparently satisfactory performance
violated implied good faith covenant inherent in all contracts, including employment
contracts, and thus, a duty accrued to the employer to do nothing that would deprive the
employee of the benefits of the employment bargain). Cleary is a pre-Foley case.
Compare id. with Foley, 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988); see also supra note 119.
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ethical conduct."2 It "does not create a duty for the employer to
terminate . . . employee[s] only for good cause,"1 4 nor does it
"mandat[e] that every termination must be for a 'fair and honest
reason.' ""n Instead, it most accurately can be viewed as "serv[ing]
to balance the inherently unequal relationship between an employer
and an employee."126
Thus, for example, the covenant has been applied to the
termination of an employee for refusing to date a supervisor."V It
has been held to apply to an implied-in-fact contract governing the
terms and procedures for the layoff of employees28 The covenant
also has been utilized to invalidate the discharge of an at-will sales
employee whose discharge occurred shortly after he completed a large
sale, but before his commission payment was due. 29 To prevent an
unfair result on these types of egregious facts, courts embracing the
implied covenant of good faith will probe the employer's motives and,
if they are deemed to have been untoward, "find" in the underlying
(express or implied) employment contract an implied good faith
promise.
Though often pled, the implied covenant of good faith is not
universally accepted 3 ° and is the least significant common law
exception to the EAWD. Fewer than one in four states clearly
recognize it in the wrongful dismissal context.131  The much more
widely used implied-in-fact contract terms/enforceable promise
doctrine is the subject of the section below.
123. See Monique C. Lillard, Fifty Jurisdictions in Search of a Standard: The Covenant
of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in the Employment Context, 57 MO. L. REV. 1233 (1992);
Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Implied Covenant Anachronism or Augur?, 20 SETON HALL L.
REv. 683 (1990); Michael T. Zoretic, Baldwin v. Sisters of Providence: Washington Gives
at Will Employees a Gun with No Ammunition to Fight Against Unjust Dismissal, 14 U.
PUGET SouND L. REv. 709 (1991).
124. Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025,1040 (Ariz. 1985) (cited
in Wilder v. Cody County Chamber of Commerce, 868 P.2d 211,221 (Wyo. 1994)); accord
Metcalf v. Intermountain Gas Co., 778 P.2d 744, 750 (Idaho 1989), modified sub nom.
Sorenson v. Comm Tek Inc., 799 P.2d 70, 75 (Idaho 1990).
125. Wilder, 868 P.2d at 221 (quoting Coombs v. Ganer Shoe Co., 778 P.2d 885, 887
(Mont. 1989)).
126. Id. (citing McCullough v. Golden Rule Ins. Co., 789 P.2d 855, 858 (Wyo. 1990)).
127. Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549, 551-52 (N.H. 1979).
128. Kerr v. Rose, 265 Cal. Rptr. 597, 603 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
129. See Fortune v. National Cash Register, 364 N.E.2d 1251,1255 (Mass. 1977); RLM
Assocs. v. Carter Mfg. Corp., 248 N.E.2d 646, 646 (Mass. 1969).
130. Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081, 1086 (Wash. 1984); Wilder, 868
P.2d at 221 (citing Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 625 P.2d 615, 629 (Haw. 1982).,
131. Phillips, supra note 116, at 448.
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b. Implied-In-Fact Contract Terms and Enforceable Promises
As discussed above, the implied covenant of good faith is grafted
onto the employer-employee relationship by force of reason or
judicial doctrine (i.e., as a matter of law) to prevent a termination due
to untoward or unfair conduct by the employer." In contrast, the
limitations falling into the second category of contract theory-based
exceptions to the EAWD are described as being "inplied-in-fact."1 33
In further contrast to the implied covenant of good faith, courts do
not invoke these exceptions as a response to the perniciousness or
repugnancy of the employer's conduct.
Instead, the implied-in-fact contract terms/enforceable promises
doctrine is recognized where some characteristic of the employment
relationship established by employer policy or practice is found to
constitute either an implied contract or contract term (which may be
bilateral or unilateral), or an enforceable tacit promise by the
employer, that employees will be terminated only for just or good
cause." The mutual intent of the employer and employee deter-
mines the existence of an implied contract term.35 In divining that
intent with regard to an implied just cause contractual term, or an
enforceable promise to that effect, the courts will look, inter alia, to
the "[p]ersonnel policies or practices of the employer, the employee's
longevity of service, actions or communications by the employer
reflecting assurances of continued employment, and the practices of
the industry in which the employer is engaged.'
3 6
The key to judicial recognition of this exception to the EAWD
is evidence that the plaintiff employee had a reasonable expectation
of continued employment that would be terminated only for good
cause.3  Thus, a long-term employee is more likely to reach the
exception than an employee with short-term service.'38 Similarly, a
,132. See supra notes 120-29 and accompanying text.
133. See sources cited infra notes 138-49.
134. See sources cited infra notes 138-49.
135. Tonry v. Security Experts, Inc., 20 F.3d 967, 971 (9th Cir. 1994).
136. Id.; see also Phillips, supra note 116, at 449 (describing factors courts consider in
determining the existence of implied-in-fact agreements between employer and employee).
137. See infra notes 138-40 and accompanying text.
138. See, e.g., Soules v. Cadam Inc., 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 6, 11 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (ruling
thitt the length of the former employee's service, her promotions, salary increases, and
superior performance ratings were relevant to determining the existence of implied
,employment agreement); Knights v. Hewlett Packard, 281 Cal. Rptr. 295, 297 (Cal. Ct.
App.. 1991) (holding that an employer's promise not to terminate employee except for
good cause may be implied from the employee's longevity of service, employer's
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course of conduct between the employer and the employee, or
customs and practices in a particular trade or industry"' that give
rise to a reasonable expectation of continued employment, can also
have that result."4
Personnel manuals and employee handbooks that enumerate
particular types of employee conduct that will result in discipline or
discharge, or that detail disciplinary procedures, are particularly
susceptible to a finding of an implied employment contract or contract
term, or an enforceable promise that limits the employer's unfettered
discretion.' 4' These employer promulgations are sometimes said to
assurances of continued employment, unwritten policy routinely followed, and common
industry practices).
139. See 30 C.J.S. Employer-Employee Relationship § 42(a) (1992); see also Hartbarger
v. Frank Paxton Co., 857 P.2d 776, 780 (N.M. 1993) (holding that a promise or offer that
supports an implied employment contract might be found in written representations such
as an employee handbook, in oral representations, in the conduct of the parties, or in a
combination of representations and conduct; when a contract term that restricts the
employer's power to discharge is implied from such representations or conduct, a contract
is implied in fact), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1068 (1994); Kelly v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 545
N.E.2d 1244,1249-50 (Ohio 1989) (ruling that the facts and circumstances surrounding an
oral employment-at-will relationship, including the character of the employment, customs,
course of dealing between parties, company policy, or any other facts that illuminate the
question, can be considered by the trier of fact to determine the explicit and implicit terms
concerning discharge); Gilmore v. Salt Lake Area Community Action Program, 775 P.2d
940 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (holding that an employee can rebut the presumption of at-will
employment by providing, inter alia, evidence pertaining to the conduct of the employer
and employee and the practices of the particular trade or industry), cert. denied, 789 P.2d
33 (Utah 1990); accord Mers v. Dispatch Printing Co., 483 N.E.2d 150, 154 (Ohio 1985).
140. See, e.g., Hartbarger, 857 P.2d at 783, in which the court stated:
To create an implied contract, the offer or promise must be sufficiently explicit
to give rise to reasonable expectations. The at-will presumption that the
employee has no reasonable expectation of continued employment applies only
to a single term of an employment relationship-that of the employer's
unabridged right to terminate the employee.
Id.; see also Sheets v. Knight, 779 P.2d 1000, 1008 n.13 (Or. 1989) (holding that an at-will
employee is one who has no reasonable expectation of continued employment); cf. Phillips
v. Butterball Farms Co., Inc., 506 N.W.2d 606, 609 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993) (ruling that an
at-will employee cannot show a reasonable expectation of continued employment) (citing
Sepanske v. Bendix Corp., 384 N.W.2d 54, 59 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985)).
141. In Hoff-ann-La Roche, Inc. v. Campbell, 512 So. 2d 725 (Ala. 1987), for example,
an employee handbook contained provisions regarding the procedures necessary to
terminate permanent employees. Id. at 735-37. The court found that a unilateral contract
had been created by the handbook and by the employee's decision to continue his
employment after becoming aware of the handbook's provisions. Id. at 737. Similarly, in
Melicharek v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 576 N.E.2d 99 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991), the employer
distributed a handbook containing provisions regarding salaries, benefits, probation, and
termination. Id. at 100. Based on the content of the handbook and its use in the
employment relationship, the court held that an enforceable contract had been established:
the employee reasonably believed an offer had been made and the employee accepted that
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"contain" an implied just cause term, by operation of the legal axiom
inclusio unius est exclusio alterius (inclusion of one thing suggests
exclusion of another). Under this rubric, an employee handbook
provision that specifies particular employee conduct or circumstances
that will trigger discharge is interpreted to constitute a contractual
commitment by the employer not to terminate the employee for
reasons other than the specified types of conduct or circumstance.142
Employee reliance on such representations of specific treatment in
specific circumstances heightens the probability that a court will deem
them enforceable. 43
offer by continuing to work for the employer after learning of the handbook's contents.
Id. at 101; see also Vajda v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 624 N.E.2d 1343, 1349 (Ill. App. Ct.
1993) (concluding that explication of dismissal procedures in employer manual created an
enforceable promise); Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081,1087 (Wash. 1984)
(holding that employers may be obligated to act in accordance with policies announced in
employee handbooks); Hogue v. Cecil I. Walker Mach. Co., 431 S.E.2d 687, 689 (W. Va.
1993) (finding a handbook's promises of job security and an employee's decision to
continue to work for that employer sufficient to create a unilateral contract); Clay v.
Horton Mfg. Co., 493 N.W.2d 379, 381 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992) (finding that while
employment is generally terminable at will by either party without cause, an employee
handbook may modify at-will employment contracts). Contra Gagne v. Northwestern Nat'l
Ins. Co., 881 F.2d 309, 317 (6th Cir. 1989) (interpreting Ohio law as rejecting the argument
that the listing of examples of employee conduct that "may" cause termination precludes
the discharge of an at-will employee for a reason not listed).
142. See, e.g., Cook v. Heck's Inc., 342 S.E.2d 453,459 (W. Va. 1986). Cook considered
an employee handbook which specified the discipline associated with violations of
particular rules. Id. This information was accompanied by a statement that the
disciplinary rules constituted a complete list. Id. The court found this to be prima facie
evidence of an offer for a unilateral contract of employment that modified the right of the
employer to discharge without cause. Id. It held that a jury question was presented as to
whether a unilateral contract existed. Id.
In a similar fashion, the court in Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 49 (Utah 1991)
held:
[W]hen it is plain that a manual or bulletin does not limit the right to discharge
at will, the case need not go to a jury. Here there are arguable issues as to just
what the terms of the manual were intended to accomplish. The manual sets
forth a number of different types of conduct that may result in discharge ....
[On these facts] a legitimate issue arises as to whether all the offenses listed are
intended to constitute the exclusive grounds for discharge. If not, a factual issue
may exist regarding Nordstrom's course of conduct in construing its rules. In any
event, the manual purports to have some binding effect with respect to
employees.
Id. at 56 (citations omitted). Contra Lilly v. Overnite Transp. Co., 995 F.2d 521,523 (1993)
(holding that while the handbook listed examples of misconduct which will not be
tolerated, the employee presented no evidence the list was intended to be exclusive).
.143. Burnside v. Simpson Paper Co., 864 P.2d 937, 943 (Wash. 1994) (citing Toussaint
v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 1980); Thompson, 685 P.2d at 1088;
Swanson v. Liquid Air Corp., 826 P.2d 664, 669 (Wash. 1992)).
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Viewed more broadly, this category of implied-in-fact exceptions
to the EAWD reflects a judicial belief that at-will employers should
be bound by the representations or promises made to employees in
employee handbooks or personnel policy manuals. Because employ-
ers expect and require their employees to abide by the policies
expressed therein, they are held to have created an atmosphere in
which employees justifiably rely on the expressed policies and, thus,
justifiably expect that the employers will do the same. If an employee
is induced to remain on the job and forego search for other employ-
ment by an employer's representations or promises (express or
implied) that in specific circumstances employees will be accorded
specific treatment, those representations or promises are viewed as
enforceable components of the employment relationship.' In much
the same manner, when presented with a detailed description of
disciplinary procedures in an employee handbook, courts may infer
the employer's commitment to follow the stated procedures in
terminating an employee.'45
Prominent disclaimers of any express or implied agreement to
modify the EAWD's basic premise can, however, immunize hand-
books and manuals against judicial findings of an implied just cause
or procedural due process obligation.4 6 The employer can disclaim
144. See supra note 143; see also Neihaus v. Delaware Valley Medical Ctr., 631 A.2d
1314 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993). In Neihaus, an employee who was refused reinstatement at the
conclusion of an approved leave of absence sued her employer. Id. The court noted that
the employer had the option to refuse the original leave request or to make clear that
there was no guarantee of reinstatement at the leave's end. Id. at 1318. Since it failed to
do either, it was held to an implied promise to reinstate the plaintiff, enforceable under
principles of promissory estoppel. Id. at 1315, 1318.
145. 30 CJ.S. Employer-Employee Relationship § 42(a) (1992); see also Campbell v.
Leaseway Customized Transp., Inc., 484 N.W.2d 41,45 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that
despite indefinite employee handbook language defining violations that warrant discipline,
a contract may be formed if the procedures for finding a violation are described with
adequate definiteness); Federal Express Corp. v. Dutschmann, 838 S.W.2d 804, 808 (Tex:'
Ct. App. 1992), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 848 S.W.2d 282 (Tex. 1993) (upholding a jury
finding that in spite of a disclaimer, a statement contained in an employee handbook
section titled "Guaranteed Fair Treatment Policy" declaring that the company would
provide a fair internal grievance process to "all Federal Express employees and
ex-employees" created an implied contract obligating the employer to provide fair
procedures).
146. See, e.g., Wooley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1258 (N.J. 1985),
modified, 499 A.2d 515 (N.J. 1985) (ruling that a clear and prominent disclaimer forecloses
the theory of an implied just cause term); Swanson, 826 P.2d at 672 (opining thatit is
generally recognized that an employer can disclaim what might otherwise appear to be
enforceable promises in handbooks, manuals, or similar documents); cf. Hicks v. Methodist
Medical Ctr., 593 N.E.2d 119, 121 (IUI. App. Ct. 1992) (ruling that disclaimer contained in,,
an employee handbook was insufficient to negate the handbook's promises where it was
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by clearly stating in the employee handbook either (i) that the
handbook's terms can be modified at will,147 (ii) that the enumerat-
ed list of actionable conduct is not exclusive or exhaustive,"4 or (iii)
not conspicuous, but rather was located on 38th page of 39-page manual; was not entitled
"Disclaimer," but was located in a section headed "Revisions"; and was not highlighted,
printed in capital letters, or in any way prominently displayed); Kumpf v. United Tel. Co.
of Carolinas, Inc., 429 S.E.2d 869, 872 (S.C. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that the language in
the employer's handbook disclaiming any alteration of employee's at-will status was
inconspicuous and ineffective where the disclaimer was located on page 38 of a 39-page
document under the heading "CONCLUSION" and the disclaimer was not capitalized,
bolded, set apart with a distinctive border, or in contrasting type or color).
147. See, e.g., Habighurst v. Edlong Corp., 568 N.E.2d 226,228-29 (11. App. Ct. 1991);
Milroy v. K-G Retail Stores, Inc., 819 F. Supp. 857, 859 (D. Neb. 1993). In Milroy, an
employee handbook stated that it was not an employment contract and advised that
related procedures could be bypassed at the company's discretion. ld. The handbook
specifically reserved to the employer the right to discharge employees for conduct not
listed in the book. Id. The court held that the handbook did not create any contractual
restrictions on employer's right to discharge. Id. at 861; accord Harris v. Duke Power Co.,
349 S.E.2d 394, 396 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986), aff'd, 356 S.E.2d 357 (N.C. 1987); Rupinsky v.
Miller Brewing Co., 627 F. Supp. 1181, 1188 (W.D. Pa. 1986) (applying North Carolina
law); see also Wooley at 1271. The Wooley court stated:
All that need be done is the inclusion in a very prominent position of an
appropriate statement that there is no promise of any kind by the employer
contained in the manual; that regardless of what the manual says or provides, the
employer promises nothing and remains free to change wages and all other
working conditions without having to consult anyone and without anyone's
agreement; and that the employer continues to have the absolute power to fire
anyone with or without good cause.
Id. Similarly, in refusing to find an implied employment contract, a Pennsylvania court
noted:
The vagueness and the generalities [of the handbook's language] coupled with the
employer's reservation of power to unilaterally alter the handbook's terms would
lead a reasonable at-will employee to interpret its distribution as an informational
guideline, and not as the exclusive enumeration of the entire panoply of rights
and duties existing between employer and employee which served to displace the
at-will contract that already existed between employee and employer.
Martin v. Capital Cities Media, Inc., 511 A.2d 830, 839 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986), appeal
denied, 523 A.2d 1132 (Pa. 1987).
148. See, e.g., Toombs v. City of Champaign, 615 N.E.2d 50 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993). The
court stated:
We hold that this manual did not contain a clear promise. At two crucial places,
the manual uses terms that indicate that the lists of the types of termination and
dismissal were not exhaustive. In particular, using the term 'includes' when
introducing the list of the types of termination indicates that other types of
termination might exist. Further, the manual also clearly stated that the
employee 'may' be dismissed for certain enumerated reasons, which similarly
does not specifically preclude dismissal for any number of other reasons.
Id., at 52. In Suter v. Harsco Corp., 403 S.E.2d 751 (W. Va. 1991), the court held that
"[a]n, employer may protect itself from being bound by statements made in an employee
handbook by having each prospective employee acknowledge in his employment
application that the employment is for no definite period and by providing in the
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that the specification of procedures and policies does not constitute
a waiver of management's power summarily to terminate at will.149
Despite the arguable safe harbor provided by a carefully worded,
sufficiently prominent and clear disclaimer, cases invoking the
implied-in-fact contract term/enforceable promises doctrine continue
to proliferate. Most states recognize this exception to the general
EAWD rule,' especially in cases involving employee handbook
language. In the section below, the analysis turns to the tort-theory-
based exception to the EAWD rule.
2. The Public Policy, Tort-Theory-Based Exception to the EAWD
The only widely embraced tort cause of action15 that signifi-
cantly limits the EAWD freedom of employers to discharge employ-
ees is based on the proposition that the common law will not tolerate
employer termination actions that contradict or violate a clear public
policy founded on the Constitution, statutory law, government rule or
regulation, or the common law.5 2  Across jurisdictions there is
employment handbook that the handbook's provisions are not exclusive." Id. at 752. For
further discussion, see Stephen F. Befort, Employee Handbooks and the Legal Effect of
Disclaimers, 13 INDUS. REL. L. J. 326, 348-57 (1991-92) (discussing the design of effective
disclaimers and limitations on disclaimer enforcement); Michael A. Chagares, Utilization
of the Disclaimer as an Effective Means to Define the Employment Relationship, 17
HOFSTRA L. REV. 365,382 n.132 (1989) (citing Dell v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 811 F.2d
970, 972 (6th Cir. 1987), wherein the court gave effect to a disclaimer in the employer's
discipline reference guide that a statement that the document could be modified by the
employer at its discretion and to an assertion that the document's list of actionable conduct
was not exhaustive); Kenneth J. Kelly, Workplace Litigation, in 22ND ANNUAL INSTITUTE
ON EMPLOYMENT LAW at 7,28-29 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series
No. 476, 1993); accord Castiglione v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 517 A.2d 786, 793 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1986), cert. denied, 523 A.2d 1013 (Md. 1987).
149. See, e.g., Arnold v. Diet Ctr., Inc., 746 P.2d 1040, 1041 n.1 (Idaho Ct. App. 1987)
(finding that a disclaimer in an employee handbook which provided that "[t]his handbook
is not an employment contract, and an employee can be terminated at any time" was clear
and effective); Perry v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 508 So. 2d 1086,1088 (Miss. 1987) (holding
that the plaintiff dischargee's claim fails because the employment agreement stated that
the employer did not intend to waive its right to terminate employees unilaterally by
promulgating policy handbooks); see also supra note 119.
150. Phillips, supra note 116, at 448 n.42.
151. 30 CJ.S. Employer-Employee Relationship § 81 (1992). Other collateral tort
remedies for wrongful discharge include fraud and deceit, interference with contractual
relations, infliction of emotional distress and defamation. See, e.g., Nina G. Stillman,
Wrongful Discharge: Contract, Public Policy and Tort Claims in 22ND ANNUAL INSTITUTE
ON EMPLOYMENT LAW AT 195, § III (PLI Litig. and Admin. Practice Course Handbook
Series No. 476 (1993)).
152. See, e.g., Springer v. Weeks & Leo Co., 429 N.W.2d 558, 560-61 (Iowa 1988)
(holding that an employer may be liable in tort for the retaliatory discharge of an
employee when the discharge violates a clearly expressed state public policy); Pilcher v.
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broad recognition of several categories of employee terminations that
fall outside of the shield of the EAWD rule because they contravene
public policy."'
"Whistle blowers"-employees who expose, report, or protest an
employer's illegal activity-are often protected by courts against
retaliatory discharge." Similarly, an employer that terminates an
Board of Wyandotte County Comm'rs, 787 P.2d 1204, 1208 (Kan. Ct. App. 1990) (stating
that relief for the tort of retaliatory discharge is available where the discharge contravenes
a clear public policy); Krajsa v. Keypunch, Inc., 622 A.2d 355,358-60 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993)
(holding that there is no common-law cause of action for the discharge of an at-will
employee, and no cause of action for the wrongful discharge of an at-will employee based
on employer's specific intent to harm the employee, as the only exception to the EAWD
arises from discharges that violate the clear mandates of public policy).
153. See Note, Protecting Employees at Will Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public
Policy Exception, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1931, 1936-37 (1983). The author observed:
Although the public policy exception is still evolving, courts have so far found it
to apply to discharges involving three broad categories of motives. 1. Refusing
to Commit an Unlawful Act. - The most typical cases are those of employees
fired for refusing to give false testimony at a trial or administrative hearing. 2.
Performing an Important Public Obligation. - Several states have recognized a
cause of action for employees fired for serving jury duty, for blowing the whistle
on illegal conduct by their employers, or for refusing to violate a professional
code of ethics. 3. Exercising a Statutory Right or Privilege. - A third category
of cases involves employees fired for filing workers' compensation claims or
refusing to take polygraph tests.
Id. (citations omitted).
154. See, e.g., McQuary v. Bel Air Convalescent Home, Inc., 684 P.2d 21, 24 (Or. Ct.
App. 1984) ("We therefore hold that an employee is protected from discharge for good
faith reporting of what the employee believes to be patient mistreatment to an appropriate
authority."); Texas Dep't. of Human Servs. v. Green, 855 S.W.2d 136, 146 (Tex. Ct. App.
1993) (granting reinstatement, actual damages, exemplary damages, attorney's fees, plus
pre- and post-judgment interest to an architect who had been discharged in retaliation for
calling attention to fraud and corruption in construction contracts); cf. Mistishen v. Falcone
Piano Co., Inc., 630 N.E.2d 294,296 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994) (ruling that employee who was
discharged for reporting to her supervisor what she believed to be the employer's unfair
and deceptive warranty practices did not engage in "whistleblowing" sufficient to trigger
the protection of the public policy exception).
Several state legislatures have enacted statutes protecting employees who engage in
certain acts of whistleblowing from discharge and other forms of retaliatory employer
action. Seee.g., HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 378-61 to -69 (1988); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275-E
(Supp. 1991); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:19-1 to -8 (1988); see also, e.g., Hawaiian Airlines v.
Norris, 114 S. Ct. 2239,2251 (1994) (holding that airline mechanic allegedly discharged for
refusing to sign an inaccurate maintenance certification document and subsequently
notifying the Federal Aviation Administration of the impropriety was not preempted from
pursing a wrongful discharge cause of action under a state whistleblower statute by the
arbitration discharge appeals procedure provided by the Railway Labor Act.); Appeal of
Bio Energy Corp., 607 A.2d 606, 608-10 (N.H. 1992) (ruling that employee was not
required to report employer's alleged violation of law to a third party in order to come
within the state's whistleblowers' act, and that award of back pay was proper and necessary
to vindicate important public rights); Abbamont v. Piscataway Township Bd. of Educ., 634
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otherwise at-will employee for refusing to commit an unlawful act at
the employer's behest is not shielded by the EAWD."55 In a
number of states, at-will discharges that violate a state or federal anti-
discrimination statute also give rise to a separate cause of action for
wrongful discharge in tort, under the public policy rubric, independent
of the related statutory remedy."' In the same manner, at-will
A.2d 538,543-45 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993), cert. granted, 641 A.2d 1039 (N.J. 1994)(holding that industrial arts teacher who alleged he was not rehired in retaliation for his
complaints about inadequate ventilation in his shop proved violations of New Jersey's
"Conscientious Employee Protection Act," NJ.S.A. 34:19-3(a) (1988)).
155. See, e.g., Sides v. Duke Univ. Hosp., 328 S.E.2d 818,825 (N.C. App. 1985) (holding
that a nurse who was terminated after she refused to commit perjury on behalf of her
employer stated a claim for wrongful discharge because the termination contravened public
policy), review denied, 333 S.E.2d 490 (N.C. 1985), review denied, 335 S.E.2d 13 (N.C.
1985); Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330, 1336-37 (Cal. 1980) (holding that
"an employer's authority over its employee does not include the right to demand that the
employee commit a criminal act to further its interests, and an employer may not coerce
compliance with such unlawful directions by discharging an employee who refuses to
follow such an order," and that "[a]n employer engaging in such conduct violates a basic
duty imposed by law upon all employers, and thus an employee who has suffered damages
as a result of such discharge may maintain a tort action for wrongful discharge against the
employer"); Lucas v. Brown & Root, Inc., 736 F.2d 1202,1205 (8th Cir. 1984) (ruling that
an employee who resists her supervisor's sexual advances cannot be terminated at will for
refusing to commit an act of prostitution); cf. Carter v. GC Elecs., 599 N.E.2d 11, 15 (II1.
App. Ct. 1992) (refusing to permit employee to reach the public policy-based exception
to the EAWD when employee waited until after his discharge to notify corporate superiors
of his refusal to comply with an order to conceal an improper disbursement during course
of corporate reorganization); Hamann v. Gates Chevrolet, Inc., 723 F. Supp. 63, 65 (N.D.
Ind. 1989) (holding that employee who had refused for two years previously to perform
illegal automobile title work did not prove causal link between that refusal and her
discharge for assisting another employee who was processing a questionable title; because
the discharge did not result from the plaintiff employee's refusal to perform an illegal act,
she could not reach the public policy exception to the EAWD), affd, 910 F.2d 1417 (7th
Cir. 1990).
156. See, e.g., Tate v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 833 P.2d 1218 (Okla. 1992), in which the
court held that a racially motivated discharge or retaliation for filing a racial discrimination
complaint offends public policy and thus is a tortious breach of a contractual obligation
compensable in damages. Id. at 1225. Ruling that the state anti-discrimination statute
does not provide an exclusive remedy for racial discrimination in employment, the court
found that it therefore does not abrogate the employee's common-law claim for tortious
breach of contractual obligations. Id. See also, e.g., Broomfield v. Lundell, 767 P.2d 697,
703 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that state law barring sex-based employment
discrimination did not preempt employee's common-law tort action for wrongful discharge
allegedly due to pregnancy); Erickson v. Marsh & McLennan Co., Inc., 545 A.2d 812, 815
(NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988) (ruling that New Jersey's employment discrimination
statute did not preempt common-law claim for wrongful discharge based on sex
discrimination), modified on other grounds 569 A.2d 793, 804 (NJ. 1990); cf. Tonack v.
Montana Bank of Billings, 854 P.2d 326,331 (Mont. 1993) (permitting concurrent filing of
claims under state Wrongful Discharge Act and other state or federal statutes, but holding
state Act is not applicable if the claim is affirmatively determined under another statute);
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discharges arising from an employee's exercise of a statutory right,
such as the filing of a worker's compensation claim,"5 7 or an
employment discrimination claim under a state pEP law,158 or
reporting a safety violation'59 often will be deemed unlawful. Such
"retaliatory discharges" generally require proof that the termination
was undertaken in reprisal for activities protected by a clearly
mandated public policy"6 that is rooted in established Constitutional
precepts, legislative enactments, legislatively approved administrative
regulations, or judicial opinions.'
Aside from these broadly recognized public policy exceptions, the
case law reflects significant variation among the states. Thus, some
states have held that the public policy exception protects an employ-
ee's refusal to contribute to an employer-supported political action
committee, 62 refusal to participate in lobbying encouraged by a
Gandy v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 872 P.2d 859, 861-62 (N.M. 1994) (holding that an
employee allegedly terminated for filing a discrimination complaint against her employer
under a state FEP statute may also bring an independent tort claim for retaliatory
discharge); Clay v. Advanced Computer Applications, Inc., 559 A.2d 917,919-20 (Pa. 1989)
(interpreting the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 951-63
(1991), as permitting employee's wrongful termination suit if, one year after filing a
complaint under the Act, the enforcing administrative agency dismisses the complaint or
fails to enter into a conciliation agreement to resolve it).
157. See, e.g., Niesent v. Homestake Mining Co. of California, 505 N.W.2d 781, 784
(S.D. 1993) (holding that the public policy exception includes a cause of action for
wrongful discharge if the dismissal is in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation
claim); Borden, Inc. v. Guerra, 860 S.W.2d 515, 522 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993) (ruling that an
employee fired for filing a workers' compensation claim had a wrongful discharge cause
of action).
158. See Gandy, 872 P.2d at 861-62.
159. See, e.g., Sorge v. Wright's Knitwear Corp., 832 F. Supp. 118, 120-21 (E.D. Pa.
1993) (holding that a former employee's allegations of retaliatory discharge as the result
of his reporting workplace safety violations came within the public policy exception to
at-will employment doctrine); Bleich v. Florence Crittenton Servs. of Baltimore, Inc., 632
A.2d 463, 469-70 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993) (ruling that retaliation against a teacher who
reported alleged safety violations at licensed residential child care facility violated public
policy found in various child abuse and neglect statutes and regulations).
160. See Lilly v. Overnite Transp. Co,, 995 F.2d 521, 524 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that
driver's discharge for refusing to operate a delivery truck with defective brakes violated
public policy and gave rise to claim for wrongful discharge); Paskarnis v.
Darien-Woodridge Fire Protection Dist., 623 N.E.2d 383, 385 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (ruling
that allegations that a fire chief was discharged in retaliation for his speaking out against
his employer's failure to properly train part-time firefighters stated a retaliatory discharge
claim).
161. Bowe v. Charleston Area Medical Ctr., Inc., 428 S.E.2d 773, 777 (W. Va. 1993)
(per curiam).
162. Culler v. Blue Ridge Elec. Coop., Inc., 422 S.E.2d 91, 93 (S.C. 1992).
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public employer, 63 refusal to violate federal highway safety regula-
tions," exercise of the right to petition for redress of grievances
and seek access to the courts, 65 exercise of shareholder rights,1 66
refusal to give false information to federal government investiga-
tors," and performance of "important public deeds."'16  In
contrast, courts in other jurisdictions have permitted the EAWD to
shield terminations triggered by employees exercising the freedom of
association, 69 the right to free speech, 7 ' and the right to marry
the person of one's choice.' 71
Among the jurisdictions that recognize the public policy
exception there is substantial disagreement about the propriety of
looking beyond clear pronouncements by the legislative body to
identify actionable public policy. The apparent majority view reflects
a belief that the reach of the public policy exception is properly
restricted to the explications of statutes and state constitutions. Thus,
the California Supreme Court has asserted that courts "may not
declare public policy without a basis in either the constitution or
statutory provisions."72 Under this view, "the [public] policy also
163. Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894, 900 (3d Cir. 1983) (applying
Pennsylvania law).
164. Coman v. Thomas Mfg. Co., 381 S.E.2d 445, 447-48 (N.C. 1989).
165. McClung v. Marion County Comm'n, 360 S.E.2d 221, 227 (W. Va. 1987).
166. Bowman v. State Bank of Keysville, 331 S.E.2d 797, 800-01 (Va. 1985).
167. Hanson v. Gichner Sys. Group, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 403, 407 (M.D. Pa. 1993).
168. Mistishen v. Falcone Piano Co., 630 N.E.2d 294, 296 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994); see
also supra note 130; infra note 176 and accompanying text.
169. Staats v. Ohio Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 620 F. Supp. 118, 120 (W.D. Pa. 1985) (mem.).
170. Martin v. Capital Cities Media, Inc., 511 A.2d 830, 842-43 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986),
appeal denied, 523 A.2d 1132 (Pa. 1987); cf. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983)
(holding that public employees may not be discharged for speech going to matters of
public concern.); McAuliff v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892)
(Holmes, J.) (denying relief to a policeman discharged for exercising his right to free
speech because "the petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has
no constitutional right to be a policeman.").
171. Salazar v. Furr's, Inc., 629 F. Supp. 1403, 1409 (D.N.M. 1986); McCluskey v. Clark
Oil & Ref. Corp., 498 N.E.2d 559, 561 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
172. Gantt v. Sentry Ins., 824 P.2d 680, 687 (Cal. 1992); see also Parada v. City of
Colton, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 309, 312 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) ("The public policy must involve
a subject which affects the public at large rather than a purely personal or proprietary
interest of the plaintiff or employer."). That even this apparent restrictive view of the
sources of public policy is subject to some interpretation is indicated by Sequoia Ins. Co.
v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 888, 892-94 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993), which held that the
employer's precise act need not be specifically prohibited if the constitutional or statutory
provision at issue describes the type of prohibited conduct sufficiently to put the employer
on notice regarding the public policy at issue.
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must be fundamental, substantial and well-established."' Jurisdic-
tions that embrace this position 74 generally reject expansive theories
of legislative purpose or nebulous "implied" legislative in-
tent-arguments not based in express statutory or constitutional
language that are invoked in an effort to extend the public policy
exception to the EAWD.
In contrast, courts in other states impose public policy limits on
the EAWD based on nonstatutory sources, including judicial deci-
sions, administrative regulations or decisions, professional codes of
ethics, or previously undeclared policy. In the middle of these
two extreme views of the appropriate sources of public policy, courts
in some jurisdictions fill perceived gaps in existing statutory frame-
works by actively identifying and fusing the public policies and
purposes that underlie legislative pronouncements. These courts have
been willing to reverse discharges on the basis of public policy ideas,
173. Parada, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 312 (citing Gantt, 824 P.2d at 684).
174. See, for example, Harris v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 649, 652 (Cal.
App. Ct. 1993), in which the court stated that, in order for a former employee to maintain
action for wrongful discharge on grounds that the discharge contravenes a fundamental
public policy, that policy must be grounded in either a constitutional or statutory provision.
Similarly, in Selof v. Island Foods, Inc., 623 N.E.2d 386,387 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993), the court
explained that to establish a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge in violation of public
policy, plaintiff must show that she exercised a statutory or constitutional right, she was
discharged in retaliation for her activity, and that the defendant-employer's conduct was
motivated by an unlawful consideration. See also, e.g., Blair v. Physicians Mut. Ins., 496
N.W.2d 483, 486 (Neb. 1993) (holding that, unless constitutionally, statutorily, or
contractually prohibited, an employer may terminate an at-will employee at any time with
or without reason and not be liable for its actions); Krajsa v. Keypunch, Inc., 622 A.2d 355,
360 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (holding that the only exception to the employment-at-will
doctrine is for discharges which violate a clear mandate of public policy); Brockmeyer v.
Dun & Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834,840 (Wis. 1983) ("The public policy must be evidenced
by a constitutional or statutory provision.").
175. 30 CJ.S. Employer-Employee Relationship § 68(b) (1992); see also Pierce v. Ortho
Pharmaceutical Corp., 417 A.2d 505 (NJ. 1980). In Pierce, the New Jersey Supreme Court.
stated:
We hold that an employee has a cause of action for wrongful discharge when the
discharge is contrary to a clear mandate of public policy. The sources of public
policy include legislation; administrative rules, regulations or decisions; and
judicial decisions. In certain instances, a professional code of ethics may contain
an expression of public policy. However, not all such sources express a clear
-mandate of public policy. For example, a code of ethics designed to serve only
the interests of a profession or an administrative regulation concerned with
technical matters probably would not be sufficient.
Id at 512.
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meanings, and objectives that are not expressly articulated in
legislative or constitutional provisions.176
Notwithstanding the more expansive views of the appropriate
sources of public policy, case law confirms that courts are most apt to
invoke the public policy exception when plaintiff employees rely on
administrative codes, regulations, statutes, constitutional provisions,
or common-law principles that bear directly on the challenged
termination. Judicial intervention also is more probable when the
operative public policy is grounded in a clear legislative or constitu-
tional pronouncement or writing. Thus, it can be reliably inferred
that where employment termination disputes involve problems or
issues unanticipated and unaddressed by legislation, the Constitution,
or established common-law doctrine, employers seldom run afoul of
the public policy exception.
V. THE INTERACTION BETWEEN THE EAWD AND
EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE AGREEMENTS TO ARBITRATE
STATUTORY FAIR EMPLOYMENT PRACrIcES CLAIMS
The analysis now returns to the central question posited at the
outset of this article: Can at-will employers secure the purported
benefits of arbitrating statutory fair employment practices claims
without inadvertently limiting, or completely surrendering, the
remaining discretion to terminate employees presently enjoyed under
the modem EAWD?'" The answer to this question lies in the
effect of the interaction between employer-employee agreements to
arbitrate statutory FEP claims and the EAWD. The commentary
immediately below describes the first category of those interaction
176. See, e.g., Mistishen v. Falcone Piano Co., 630 N.E.2d 294, 296 (Mass. App. Ct.
1994) ("While the importance of a public deed is not determined on the sole basis of
whether the law absolutely requires its performance, such a mandate would bespeak a
legislative determination of the importance of the act to the public." (citation omitted)).
The New Hampshire Supreme Court likewise applies a more liberal test for public policy-
based discharges, holding that public policy is contravened when an employer terminates
an employee for performing an act which public policy would encourage, or for refusing
to perform an act which public policy would condemn. Short v. School Admin. Unit No.
16,612 A.2d 364,370 (N.H. 1992); see also Bravo v. Dolsen Cos., 862 P.2d 623,629 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1993) (ruling that a wrongful discharge tort action exists if the discharge
contravenes a clear mandate of public policy, including legislatively recognized public
policies).
177. An important collateral question also examined below, see infra notes 180-202 and
accompanying text, centers on the manner in which the existing EAWD case law Will affect
the implementation of contractual agreements to arbitrate.
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effects, those specifically indicated by the previously examined
modem EAWD case law.
Of the two categories of limitations imposed on the EAWD
during the course of the last sixty years-legislative and judicially
fashioned-those imposed by the judiciary without the benefit of
explicit legislative direction are the grist of this analysis. As demon-
strated above, it is easy to ascertain the result of the interaction
between the EAWD and the substantive protections of the several
FEP statutes when statutory FEP claims are submitted to arbitration.
The EAWD simply does not shield discharges by at-will employers
that abrogate the statutorily guaranteed FEP rights of terminated
protected-group members. The statutory FEP protections trump the
EAWD.
Uncertainty arises, however, when the focus shifts to the likely
effects of the interaction between the several judicially fashioned
exceptions to the EAWD and employer-employee agreements to
arbitrate statutory FEP claims. Skilled lawyers can certainly draft
arbitration agreements that, by their unequivocal terms, purport to
obligate the employee and employer to arbitrate statutory FEP claims
while preserving the employer's at-will freedom.17 It is less clear
that when courts scrutinize the manner in which those agreements are
implemented they will consistently be given that effect. The potential
impact of the three common-law doctrines used by judges to constrain
the EAWD-the implied covenant of good faith, the implied-in-fact
contract terms/enforceable promises doctrine, and the public policy
exception-is uncertain when the doctrines are applied within the
milieu of contractual agreements to arbitrate statutory FEP claims.
Each of the probable specific interaction effects will be examined in
turn.
17 9
178. See Mathiason & Ober, supra note 9, at 909; Christopher H. Mills, Drafting
Employment Agreements: Practical and Legal Considerations, in HDNDLING CORPORATE
EMPLOYMENT PROBLEMS 1991, at 470 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook
Series No. 410 (1991)).
,179. The authors' research reveals no reported cases to date precisely addressing the
possible effects of the interaction between the EAWD and employer-employee agreements
to arbitrate statutory FEP claims. Consequently, what follows is by necessity a largely
heuristic evaluation, based on extrapolation from the existing EAWD case law, of the
likelyinteraction between the EAWD and the emerging phenomenon signaled by Gilmer
and its progeny.
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A. Arbitration Agreements and the Implied Covenant of Good
Faith
By agreeing with its employees to arbitrate unresolved statutory
FEP claims, an employer introduces a contract into an otherwise con-
tract-free employment relationship. In doing so, the employer raises
the possibility that the arbitration agreement will form the basis for
a judicial attribution to both parties of an implied, enforceable
obligation to deal with one another fairly and in good faith within the
context of the agreement to arbitrate. Disclaimers, either general in
nature or specifically directed toward the implied covenant of good
faith, may not be an effective barrier to invocation of the covenant,
because the usual rule is that the obligation to conduct contractual
relations in good faith cannot be waived.Y
Because this exception is a creature of judicial conscience that
has not been embraced by a majority of the states,"' its use within
the context of employer-employee agreements to arbitrate statutory
FEP claims seems likely to vary widely across jurisdictions. Despite
the prospect of uneven application, it would be a mistake to infer that
the implied covenant of good faith cannot have a significant impact.
The interests at issue in contractual agreements to arbitrate statutory
FEP claims implicate significant constitutional and statutory rights.
Consequently, they are of great interest to the public and raise
important public policy concerns. Courts are certain to be highly
predisposed to read into them a good faith obligation.
At bottom, the implied covenant of good faith requires the
employer to "shoot straight" and to "do the right thing." In the
context of arbitration of statutory REP claims, where the covenant is
recognized, it will be applied to ensure that employers respect the
180. For cases holding that the duty of good faith cannot be waived, see, for example,
Brazell v. First Nat'l Bank and Trust Co., No. 86C20244, 1990 WL 304281, at *7 (N.D. Il.
June 7,1990); Centerbank v. Dowcom, Inc., No. 111626, LEXIS 3024, at *4 (Conn. Super.
Ct. Nov. 17, 1993); Rhode Island Hosp. Trust v. Martin Trust, No. 700674, LEXIS 420, at
*7-8 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 3, 1992); Perling v. Citizens and Southern Nat'l Bank, 300
S.E.2d 649, 652 (Ga. 1983); New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Lundquist, 198 N.W.2d 543,
549 n.4 (Minn. 1972); Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. v. Lenape Resources Corp., 870 S.W.2d
286,293 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993). Also, see U.C.C. § 1-203 (1976), which states that "[e]very
contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or
enforcement." U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (1990) makes this duty nonwaivable.
181. 2 MARK A. ROTHSTEn ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW, § 9.6 (1994) (noting that "[a]
little more than one-fifth of the states have permitted the use of the implied-in-law
covenant of good faith and fair dealing to challenge discharges or other employer actions
in certain limited situations").
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express terms of the arbitration agreements they enter into with their
employees. Thus, employers will have to comply with the provisions
of the arbitration procedure that control the types of claims that can
be raised (substantive arbitrability), timeliness and other procedural
matters (procedural arbitrability), arbitrator selection and compen-
sation, finality of the arbitrator's award, and the like. Furthermore,
employers will be expected to implement the remedial orders of
arbitrators in an expeditious and forthright manner, without obfus-
cation." Finally, the courts will use the implied covenant of good
faith to police any other untoward employer conduct that harms the
employee who has chosen to arbitrate a statutory claim or that
seriously diminishes the value of the procedural and substantive
protections the arbitration mechanism was intended to provide.
It is unclear what remedies courts would deem appropriate if they
determined that the employer had breached the covenant. The
breach at issue would go not to the decision to discharge, but to the
employer's conduct with regard to an alternative dispute resolution
procedure serving as a surrogate for litigation in court. Therefore, it
is difficult to discern under what conditions a court, finding a breach
of the implied covenant of good faith, might be willing to reverse the
underlying discharge. A conception of this dimension of the impact
of the implied covenant of good faith is illustrated by Figure I below,
in which the bipolar axis of the continuum measures the degree to
which a court might interfere with the employer's at-will freedom to
terminate employees for reasons not proscribed by statute.
At one end of this continuum (point (A)), when a reviewing court
finds the employer in breach of the covenant due to its refusal to
arbitrate or due to other conduct that prevented arbitration of the
employee's statutory FEP claim, a remand to arbitration is the likely
outcome. At the opposite continuum pole (point (D)), when the
employee's claim has been denied in arbitration but a reviewing court
concludes that the result was achieved in whole or in part through ex-
treme bad faith conduct by the employer," it is quite possible that
a discharge otherwise consistent with law"8 will be reversed.
182. Remedial orders may include reinstatement, back or front pay, compensatory
and/or punitive damages. See MARVIN F. HILL & ANTHONY SINICROPI, BUREAU OF NAT.
AFFAIRS, REMEDIES IN ARBITRATION 135-284 (2d ed. 1991).
183. An example of such bad faith conduct might be introducing falsified documents
at the hearing that are then relied upon by the arbitrator.
184. This would occur through a finding of no violation of the FEP statute(s) at issue
in the arbitration.
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(A) (B) (C) (D)
* No Arbitration e Arbitration * No Arbitration * Arbitration
* Arbitration * Claim Upheld e Fair Hearing e Claim Denied
Directed e Arbitral Remedy Impossible * Discharge Reversed
Enforced * Discharge Reversed
The middle range nearest the first scenario (point (B)), repre-
sents the situation when, at the conclusion of arbitration, the
arbitrator upholds the employee's claim and the employer, in breach
of the covenant, refuses to implement the remedy ordered. It is likely
that a court would merely enforce the arbitration award and attendant
remedy order."r A second midrange point (point (C)) is nearer in
character to the right-hand continuum pole. In this scenario, no
arbitration has been conducted, but a court ascertains that the
employer's conduct in breach of the covenant was so egregious or was
otherwise of such a nature that a fair arbitration no longer can be
held."8 In this situation, reversal of the discharge appears certain.
In all of these circumstances, particularly troublesome employer
behavior during the course of the arbitration procedure that is
inconsistent with the implied covenant of good faith would raise the
possibility of compensatory (contract) damages independent of the
discharge action. Of more concern to employers accustomed to
exercising unfettered discretion to discharge employees for any reason
185. The results at points (A) and (B) of the continuum could also be achieved through
an action brought under section 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act seeking either an order
compelling a recalcitrant employer to arbitrate (A), or an order enforcing the arbitrator's
award (B). See 9 U.S.C. §§ 2, 3, 4, 13 (1988); see also supra part VI.
186. An example might be threatening employees called to testify on the claimant
employee's behalf with retaliation if they did so.
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not otherwise barred by law is that employees who were judged to
have been terminated for lawful reasons under the particular FEP
statute and under the EAWD, or who probably would have been so
judged, could nevertheless be reinstated, perhaps with a monetary
remedy. This situation is symbolized by the right-hand range of the
continuum above (points (C) and (D)).
Confronting this reality will be a new and sobering experience for
at-will employers accustomed to a free hand in termination matters.
Although application of the implied covenant of good faith in this
context would not establish a de facto just cause guarantee, 117 it
would diminish, indirectly but significantly, the EAWD shield. That
prospect is a weighty consideration for at-will employers in deciding
whether to use arbitration as an alternative device for adjudicating the
statutory FEP claims of their employees.
B. Arbitration Agreements and the Implied-In-Fact Exceptions to
the EAWD
Unlike the implied covenant of good faith, the interaction
between employer-employee agreements to arbitrate statutory FEP
claims and the implied-in-fact exceptions to the EAWD will not be
triggered by repugnant or pernicious employer conduct toward
employees. Rather, it will arise where a court finds that the manner
in which the employer promulgates, articulates, and implements the
arbitration procedure for statutory FEP claims constitutes an implied
contract or contract term, or an enforceable tacit promise, to
terminate employees only for just cause. Here, the critical tasks for
employers will be careful drafting of the arbitration agreement and
consistent application and implementation of its terms.
For employers desiring to arbitrate only statutory FEP claims,
while retaining the freedom to discharge employees at-will for any
reason(s) not in violation of those statutes, the first step wil be
careful crafting of the arbitration agreement and any employee
handbook provisions addressing the arbitration procedure. The key
will be a clear definition of the scope of the arbitration mechanism
and an equally clear disclaimer of any intention to arbitrate nonstatu-
tory matters, including discharge, that fall outside its reach. The most
reliable way to articulate the procedure's scope would be an enumera-
187. See supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text.
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tion of the specific statutes within its reach:"s  Title VII, the
ADEA, the ADA, section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866,",
the Equal Pay Act, and the new Family and Medical Leave Act.9
That statement, along with a prominent disclaimer of any express or
implied agreement or intention to embrace nonstatutory claims or to
modify the EAWD's basic premise, should effectively restrict the
arbitration procedure to claimed violations of the cited FEP statutes.
The next step toward avoiding a breach of the EAWD shield
involves the implementation and administration of the arbitration
mechanism. This step will be much more difficult for at-will employ-
ers to handle competently. The implied-in-fact case law reveals a
number of recurring scenarios, or "trip wires," that can furnish a court
with the basis for inferring a contract, a contract term, or an enforce-
able promise that obligates the employer to arbitrate matters other
than claimed statutory FEP violations.
In explaining the arbitration agreement to employees, employers
must describe clearly the limited scope of the appeals procedure it
creates. They must avoid speaking in broad terms of guarantees of
"fairness," "workplace justice," and "workplace due process." Forth-
rightness and accuracy is critical. Employees must not be given any
reasonable basis to believe that they are agreeing to anything more
188. A major question for the employer in this regard is whether to open the scope of
the arbitration mechanism to claims beyond the FEP statutes cited by embracing other
employment rights statutes like the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), 29
U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); the Employee Retirement and Income Security
Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); the Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 201-219 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); the Worker Adjustment and
Retraining Notification Act (WARN), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109 (1983 & Supp. IV 1992);
state worker compensation statutes; and the like. Extending the range of arbitral issues
beyond the basic fair employment statutes is probably ill-advised. The types of disputes
most amenable to resolution through an expedited, simplified proceeding like arbitration
are those involving individual employees' claims centering on matters of discharge,
promotion, layoff and other discrete, routine personnel actions. It is the authors' belief
that these individual claims are the predominant types of cases that are adjudicated under
Title VII and the other FEP statutes. In contrast, statutory schemes like OSHA, ERISA,
FLSA, WARN, and worker compensation statutes more often than not involve highly
specialized adjudications based on extensive administrative agency rules, adjudications, and
related case law. Moreover, these statutes typically have highly developed administrative
enforcement schemes that likely would not comport well with arbitration. See, e.g.,
Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 659-666 (1988) (establishing
the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission and the scheme for enforcing
OSHA). The administrative rules that implement the enforcement scheme are provided
at 29 C.F.R. § 2200 (1993).
189. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
190. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 2601-2654 (West Supp. 1994).
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than a procedure for arbitrating employer actions claimed to be in
violation of the explicit protections and rights secured to them by the
FEP statutes expressly embraced by the arbitration procedure.
Employers should avoid overselling the attributes and scope of the
arbitration agreement."
Further caution should be exercised if, as frequently is the case,
the arbitration mechanism is linked to a prearbitration grievance
procedure or mediation step. An implied contract term or enfor-
ceable promise may be created by any statement, action, or represen-
tation by a front-line supervisor, higher level manager, or employee
relations official which implies that disputes, other than those linked
directly to a bona fide claim of a statutory FEP violation, will be
arbitrated. Thus, when an employee attempts to join a statutory FEP
claim with collateral matters not within the reach of the arbitration
procedure, the employer must make clear that only the facts and
circumstances pertinent to the statutory FEP claim will be arbitrated.
In the same manner, it may be necessary before entering into a pre-
arbitration mediation effort for the employer to secure a stipulation
from the employee (and employee's counsel) that the entire media-
tion is off the record and will not be cited in any other proceeding,
either judicial or arbitral.
191. Through their conduct, remarks and writings, employers can unwittingly oversell
the scope of a contractual arbitration mechanism. In Clay v. Horton Mfg. Co., Inc., 493
N.W.2d 379,380-82 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992), for example, the employer's handbook contained
a prominent disclaimer: "This handbook is intended for informational purposes only and
neither it, company practices, nor other communications create an employment contract
or term.... [T]he policies ... outlined in this handbook are subject to ... change by
management at any time." Id. at 380. The plaintiff employee asserted that, notwithstand-
ing the handbook's disclaimer, its provisions became a part of his employment contract
because of the repeated oral assurances by management personnel that those provisions
would be followed. Id. at 380-81. He alleged he was told to "obey the employee
handbook. We obey it, you obey it." Id. at 381. When the employee had questions, he
was referred to the handbook, and was repeatedly told that if he obeyed the rules in the
handbook he would keep his job. Id. The court viewed the question of whether the
handbook constituted a contract as turning on the parties' mutual intent as to the
handbook's provisions. Id. It deemed the disclaimer inconclusive, and concluded that an
employer can modify an employment contract through words and conduct, notwithstanding
a disclaimer. Id. at 382.
In Hodgson v. Bunzl Utah, Inc., 844 P.2d 331, 334 (Utah 1992), the court ruled that
evidence of conduct and oral statements can establish an implied-in-fact contract of
employment even without support of written policies, bulletins, or handbooks, if that
evidence is strong enough to overcome the presumption of at-will employment and any
inconsistent written policies and disclaimers. See also Swanson v. Liquid Air Corp., 826
P.2d 664, 668 (Wash. 1992) (holding that an employer's inconsistent representations and
conduct may negate or override a disclaimer).
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One of the primary pitfalls to which employers must remain alert
will arise if the arbitration procedure proves to be an efficient method
for expeditiously achieving satisfactory resolutions to statutory-based
disputes. If it does, there will be substantial temptation to utilize the
arbitration mechanism to resolve other, nonstatutory employer-
employee disputes that the employer does not want to litigate in
court. If the employer succumbs to that temptation routinely, or even
occasionally, the implied-in-fact doctrine will materialize to furnish a
court with a sound basis for inferring an employer commitment to
arbitrate all employment disputes. This danger will be most discern-
ible in tough, high-stakes discharge cases that normally would fall
within the purview of the EAWD.
When the employer enters into agreements with its employees to
arbitrate their statutory FEP claims, it explicitly acknowledges the
substantial statutory limitations on its freedom to terminate employees
embraced by the arbitration procedure. It must avoid allowing that
explicit congressional diminution of its authority to blossom into an
unknowing surrender of its remaining at-will discretion through the de
facto imposition of a just cause standard for discharge. If the
employer is to avail itself of the advantages of arbitration without
opening the door to judicial usurpation of the residual at-will
authority, it must monitor carefully the actions and words of its
management and supervisory officials. Any management conduct that
can trigger a reasonable belief by employees that they will be dis-
charged only for just cause, or that they will be permitted to challenge
all terminations through the arbitration mechanism, invites judicial
intervention.1 9
C. Arbitration Agreements and the Public Policy Exception to the
EAWD
There are two dimensions to the interface between employer-
employee agreements to arbitrate statutory FEP claims and the public
policy exception to the EAWD. First, the previously discussed
premise of the public policy exception establishes that otherwise
permissible at-will terminations of employees running afoul of a clear
public policy are not shielded by the EAWD.1" The second dimen-
192. Maintaining at-will discretion in the face of agreements to arbitrate statutory
employment rights claims will require extensive training of front-line supervisors,
managers, and human resources officials, as well as careful monitoring of the operation of
the arbitration procedure.
193. See supra notes 152-76 and accompanying text.
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sion is the rule of Gilmer that, as a separate public policy pertaining
to the arbitration of statutory FEP claims under the FAA, arbitration
is a suitable surrogate for litigation only if the arbitration procedure
itself provides adequate procedural and substantive due process safe-
guards.194
Few public policies relating to the employer-employee relation-
ship are more significant or far reaching than the two identified
above. In evaluating the conduct of employers in the administration
and implementation of these arbitration procedures, the courts
undoubtedly will act quickly to remedy employer conduct found to
have abridged the right of claimant employees to have their statutory
FEP claims arbitrated fairly. The signal sent to employers by the
intersection of these two public policies is unmistakable. If employers
want arbitration to function as a substitute for traditional litigation,
they must ensure that it is a truly fair procedure providing employees
with a full opportunity to challenge discharges and other personnel
actions on a level playing field.
The critical elements of a full and fair arbitration procedure will
center on matters of substantive and procedural due process.1 95
Thus, in designing the arbitration mechanism at-will employers must
ensure the right of employees to be represented by counsel or by
other persons of their choice. The procedure must provide for
adequate prehearing discovery and employers must permit reasonable
access to employee personnel records and other information or
evidence that is solely in their possession and control. The procedure
for choosing the arbitrator must ensure the mutual selection of an
194. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 30-33 (1991).
195. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 321-49 (1976). The Supreme Court held
that " 'due process' .. . is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to
time, place and circumstances[; rather, it] is flexible and calls for such procedural
protections as the particular situation demands." Id. at 334 (citing Cafeteria Workers v.
McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)). The
fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful
time and in a meaningful manner. Id. at 333. To identify the specific dictates of due
process it is generally necessary to consider three factors: the nature of the private interest
that will be affected by the official action; the risk of the erroneous deprivation of the
private interest through the procedures used, and probable value, if any, of requiring
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and the government's interest, including the
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that additional or substitute
procedural requirements would entail. I& at 334-35; see also DUNLOP COMMISSION, supra
note 3, at 115-17 (discussing the "key safeguards" that must be built into an effective
employer-employee arbitration procedure).
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individual of established neutrality and competence. 96 Employers
must avoid any type of conduct, by supervisors or others, that limits
the ability of claimant employees to call fellow employees, supervi-
sors, or managers as witnesses on their behalf Further, there can be
no retaliation against the individuals who so testify.
At all times during the progression of employee claims through
the arbitration procedure, at-will employers must avoid any actions
intended to delay the process or to make it more difficult for
employees to achieve a fair hearing of their claims. After the award
has issued, employers must move quickly and forthrightly to imple-
ment any remedy ordered by the arbitrator and must resist the
temptation to delay implementation by mounting vexatious appeals
that offer little real hope that a court will vacate or modify the award.
As with many of the other aspects of the arbitration of statutory
FEP employment rights claims, at-will employers will have to make
a conscious effort to learn to play this new game. It will be a difficult
step to open routinely employment-related decisions that formerly
were challengeable only through court action to the scrutiny of an
outsider who is given the authority to reverse or modify those actions.
Stated simply, those employers must adopt a new view of the dispute-
resolution process, at least with regard to the statutory FEP claims
that will be pursued under the arbitration procedure. Under that
view, employers place primary value on resolving employment-related
disputes accurately, fairly, expeditiously, and in a cost-effective
manner. In this context, it is important for at-will employers to real-
ize that the license granted to the courts by the public policy
exception (and where it is recognized, the implied covenant of good
196. See Republic Indus., Inc. v. Teamsters Joint Council No. 83, 718 F.2d 628, 639-40
(4th Cir. 1983) (identifying impartiality and objectivity of the arbitrator as critical elements
of an arbitration procedure with sufficient due process guarantees), cert. denied, 467 U.S.
1259 (1984). That arbitrator neutrality and competence are vital concerns is indicated by
the recent study by the Government Accounting Office of the arbitration of employee
statutory FEP claims in the securities industry under the auspices of the arbitration
mechanisms administered by the New York Stock Exchange and the National Association
of Securities Dealers. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. GAO/HEHS-94-17,
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: How REGISTERED REPRESENTATIVES FARE IN
DISCRIMINATION DISPUTES (1994). The March 1994 GAO Report expressed significant
reservation regarding the competency, neutrality and the demographic characteristics of
the arbitrators assigned to arbitrate these statutory FEP matters in the securities industry.
Id. at 12. Related information can be found in Margaret A. Jacobs, Required Job-Bias
Arbitration Stirs Critics, WALL ST. J., June 22, 1994, at B5; Margaret A. Jacobs, Riding
Crop and Slurs: How Wall St. Dealt With a Sex-Bias Case, WALL ST. J., June 9, 1994, at
Al; Steven A. Holmes, Arbiters of Bias in Securities Industry Have Slight Experience in
Labor Law, N.Y. TIMES, April 5, 1994, late ed., at 86.
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faith), in concert with the Federal Arbitration Act'--to oversee
employer behavior pertaining to the arbitration of statutory FEP
claims-is far-reaching. Any employer conduct that manifests either
a reluctance to deal with employees on an equal footing or an
unwillingness to accept unfavorable outcomes would contravene both
the substantive protections of the relevant FEP statute(s) and the
public policy favoring arbitration that is reflected in the FAA.
Consequently, such behavior by employers would beg judicial
intervention under the imprimatur of the public policy exception.
The remedies imposed by a court for this type of employer
conduct presumably will vary according to the circumstances 9' In
a manner similar to the remedy-related dimensions of the implied
covenant of good faith, egregious employer actions that prevent a full
and fair initial arbitration, or readjudication on remand to arbitration,
almost certainly would result in a judicial order reversing the under-
lying personnel action. The claimant employee would be restored to
the status quo that existed before the underlying controversy arose,
and when appropriate, would be awarded some form of monetary
remedy. Less serious actions by the employer that nevertheless
contaminate the arbitration tribunal would result in a remand to a
new arbitration proceeding or, where the employee has secured a
favorable award in arbitration, an order enforcing that award.
All of the above ramifications flowing from the decision to
arbitrate statutory FEP claims will apply to employee discharges. The
one area where some uncertainty exists in the interface between the
EAWD public policy exception and the arbitration of statutory FEP
claims is that of employee challenges to discharges alleged to be in
violation of public policy but that do not violate express statutory
provisions.' An employee's effort to arbitrate claims that a
termination was, for example, motivated by an act of "whistle blow-
ing" not protected by statute, or that the tenination was in
retaliation for refusing to perform or overlook an illegal act, will pres-
ent difficult questions of substantive arbitrability that have not yet
been addressed by the courts within the context of a narrowly drawn
agreement to arbitrate only statutory FEP claims.2'
197. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
198. See supra Figure 1.
199. See supra notes 172-76 and accompanying text.
200. This dimension of the EAWD-arbitration interaction further illustrates the
importance of carefully crafting the arbitration agreement language that defines the scope
of the procedure and disclaims those matters not expressly embraced therein. Thus, a
reference to "rights guaranteed employees under law" would almost surely embrace these
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A hint as to the Supreme Court's likely attitude toward this
question is found in the body of case law pertaining to the arbitration
of labor disputes under collective bargaining agreements. In recent
years, the Court has fashioned an exception to the general rule
insulating labor arbitration awards from judicial review on their
merits. The exception permits the federal courts to refuse to enforce
arbitration awards where enforcement would violate an explicit public
policy that is "well defined and dominant, and ascertainable by
reference to the laws and legal precedents."" 1 In the future, courts
may draw upon this component of the law of labor arbitration,
appending it to the law of commercial arbitration under the FAA to
justify hearing challenges to, and vacating awards under, employer-
employee arbitration agreements that uphold discharge decisions
arguably made in violation of public policies other than those set forth
in the various FEP statutes.2 2
A similar dilemma for the employer that involves the decision
of whether to arbitrate is presented when a challenge to a termination
action presents both an allegation of a statutory violation (e.g., a Title
VII race claim) and a nonstatutory public policy claim (e.g., based on
an asserted act of whistle blowing). In that circumstance, the em-
ployer must exercise caution in order to separate the statutory claim
from the nonstatutory claim and arbitrate only the former.
For the at-will employer, the lesson from the public policy
element of the EAWD-arbitration interface is straightforward: Courts
will not tolerate any employer action that appears or is intended to
limit the full value of the arbitration mechanism to discharged
employees, or that in any way restricts the vitality and reach of the
statutory protections that are the focus of that procedure. This is a
lesson many at-will employers may find difficult to grasp.
The obvious interaction effects between the EAWD and
arbitration of statutory FEP claims discussed above are an important
nonstatutory public policy-based claims. A procedure expressly limited to claimed
violations of specified FEP statutes would not.
201. United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 43 (1987) (quoting
W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int'l Union of United Rubber Workers, 461 U.S.
757, 766 (1983)); see also Brown v. Rauscher Pierce Refsnes, Inc., 994 F.2d 775, 779 (11th
Cir. 1993) (holding that an arbitration award may be vacated if enforcement is contrary
to public policy); Stephen L. Hayford & Anthony V. Sinicropi, The Labor Contract and
External Law: Revisiting the Arbitrator's Scope of Authority, 1993 J. DISP. RES. 1, 1-38
(1993) (discussing the public policy basis for judicial vacation of labor arbitration awards).
202. Misco, 484 U.S. at 42; see also Seymour v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 988 F.2d 1020,
1023 (10th Cir. 1993) (refusing to set aside arbitration award as against statutory or
judicially created public policy exceptions).
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factor guiding the response of at-will employers that want to preserve
what remains of the EAWD shield but also want to take advantage
of the benefits of employer-employee agreements to arbitrate. That
fact notwithstanding, the authors' research and related reflections on
this matter have led them to discern three broader, potentially more
important implications of the move toward the arbitration of statutory
FEP claims. None of these three broader, more complex interaction
effects has been addressed in the existing case law or the relevant
literature. Nevertheless, the authors submit that they could subsume
all of the matters discussed above. This second dimension of the
EAWD-arbitration interaction is the subject of the final substantive
section of this analysis.
VI. THE BROAD INTERACTION EFFECTS: THE CoMPuLSIoN TO
ARBITRATE; THE DE FACTO JUST CAUSE STANDARD; AND
DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT OF NONPROTECTED-GROUP MEMBERS
The three broad EAWD-arbitration interaction effects discussed
here will manifest themselves only with the maturation and wide-
spread use of employer-employee agreements to arbitrate statutory
FEP claims. All three are tied to the manner in which discharged at-
will employees will attempt to prove that their terminations were the
result of illegal discrimination, and are linked with a difficulty that
employers and the courts will encounter at the pre-arbitration stage.
That difficulty lies in separating defensible, minimally colorable claims
of illegal discrimination from those circumstances in which there is no
palpable basis to suspect that a violation of FEP law has occurred.
The first broad effect, the compulsion of at-will employers to
arbitrate virtually all challenged discharges of protected-group mem-
bers, will result from applying the substantive arbitrability dimension
of the law of commercial arbitration. The second effect, the emer-
gence of a de facto just cause standard for protected-group members,
will arise from the constraints that the disparate treatment order and
allocation of proof paradigm places on the discretion of at-will
employers to terminate traditionally protected-group members for
reasons other than their race, color, national origin, sex, religion, age,
or disability. The third broad interaction effect relates to the first and
second; it concerns the difficulty at-will employers may experience in
refusing to arbitrate the discharges of nonmembers of the traditionally
protected groups.
Examination of these broad phenomena is best accomplished by
contrasting the circumstances faced by traditional protected-group
members who attempt to challenge alleged wrongful discharges with
1995] 493
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those that will confront nonprotected-group members who wish to do
the same. The analysis that follows is fashioned accordingly.0 3
A. At-Will Discharges of Protected-Group Members: The
Employer's Compulsion to Arbitrate
Thoughtful appraisal of the scenario under which individual
statutory FEP claims will be arbitrated suggests a sobering revelation
for at-will employers. By agreeing to arbitrate statutory claims of
illegal employment discrimination, at-will employers will create an
adjudicatory process that employees will find much easier to initiate
and pursue than a traditional lawsuit. Consequently, those at-will
employers, over time, almost certainly will be confronted with
demands to arbitrate virtually all challenged terminations of the
members of the groups whose interests are protected under the
various FEP statutes. Protected-group members who are discharged
for what they believe to be illegitimate reasons regularly will seek
arbitral review by alleging that the reasons cited by the employer for
termination were only a pretext for illegal employment discrimination.
When at-will employers believe that discharges of protected-
group members are based on sound business-related reasons and are
not motivated by illegal discriminatory intent, they will resist
arbitration by contending that the arbitration mechanism was intended
to embrace only legitimate claims of illegal employment discrimina-
tion. In the vernacular of commercial arbitration, this employer recal-
citrance would take the form of a substantive arbitrability argument
that specious, frivolous claims of employment discrimination are not
proper subjects for arbitration under employer-employee agreements
to arbitrate statutory FEP claims. At-will employers that take this
position will force discharged protected-group members who wish to
arbitrate to resort to an appropriate judicial forum to obtain enforce-
ment of the agreement to arbitrate. It is at this point that the law of
commercial arbitration pertaining to substantive arbitrability becomes
relevant.
203. The authors' research reveals no analysis or commentary in the literature, nor any
case law, that directly identifies or addresses any of these three broader dimensions of the
relationship between employer-employee agreements to arbitrate individual statutory FEP
claims and the EAWD. Therefore, as was true with the discussion pertaining to the specific
EAWD-arbitration interaction effects, the analysis below is necessarily heuristic in nature
and based on extrapolation from the existing case law.
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1. The Relevant Law of Substantive Arbitrability
The previously discussed opinions of the United States Supreme
Court in Mitsubishi Motors Corp.,. 4 McMahon, °  Rodriguez de
Quijas,'06 and Gilmer"7 make clear that the Court considers ar-
bitration of statutory claims (FEP and otherwise) to be a matter of
commercial arbitration governed by the Federal Arbitration Act.2"8
Section 2 of the FAA makes contractual agreements to arbitrate valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable.' Section 4 of the FAA expressly
authorizes a party seeking to enforce an arbitration agreement to
petition a federal district court for an order directing that arbitration
proceed in the manner called for in the contractual agreement.21
Under the FAA, substantive arbitrability is a question for the courts,
204. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
205. Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
206. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
207. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
208. Hayford, supra note 51, at 13. Although the bulk of employment arbitration law
is founded in the national labor policy springing from section 301 of the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act [LMRA], 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§
141-97 (1988), the case law pertinent to that portion of the national labor policy is of only
collateral relevance here. Similarly, Gilmer and its progeny are not precisely on point with
regard to the substantive arbitrability dimension of employer-employee agreements to
arbitrate: The Gilmer line of cases does not speak to employer refusals to arbitrate under
contractual arbitration agreements. Rather, it is concerned with employee efforts to resist
the arbitration of statutory FEP claims. Despite the fact that it does not speak directly to
the substantive arbitrability issue, Gilmer is significant to this portion of the analysis to the
extent that it reflects a ringing endorsement of the use of arbitration as the vehicle for
resolving statutory FEP claims. See supra part II.
209. Section 2 states:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter
arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole
or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an
existing bontroversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall
be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or
in equity for the revocation of any contract.
9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
210. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1988). Section 4 states:
A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to
arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any United
States district court which, save for such agreement, would have jurisdiction
under title 28, in a civil action or in admiralty of the subject matter of a suit
arising out of the controversy between the parties, for an order directing that
such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement.... If the
making of the arbitration agreement or the failure, neglect, or refusal to perform
the same be in issue, the court shall proceed summarily to the trial thereof.
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not employers or arbitrators, to decide.2 ' The party resisting
arbitration bears the burden of proving that it is not obligated to
arbitrate.212
The relevant FAA case law establishes that when disposing of a
discharged protected-group member's petition to compel an employer
to arbitrate, a court will be presented with two questions: (i) Is there
a valid agreement to arbitrate between the employer and employee?
(ii) Do the claims asserted by the petitioner employee fall within the
scope of the arbitration mechanism?213 In making these two deter-
minations, a court is generally deemed to lack authority to examine
or evaluate the merits of the underlying dispute.214 Thus, assuming
that the employer-employee agreement to arbitrate is valid,215 the
211. See Dean Witter Reynolds v. McCoy, 995 F.2d 649, 650 (6th Cir. 1993) (per
curiam); Stotter Div. of Graduate Plastics Co. v. District 65, UAW, 991 F.2d 997, 1000-01
(2d Cir. 1993); Chastain v. Robinson-Humphrey Co., 957 F.2d 851, 853-54 (11th Cir. 1992);
see also Contracting Northwest, Inc. v. City of Fredericksburg, Iowa, 713 F.2d 382,386 (8th
Cir. 1983) (holding that, although procedural arbitrability may be determined by the
arbitrator, substantive arbitrability is a matter for the courts); cf. I.S. Joseph Co. v.
Michigan Sugar Co., 803 F.2d 396, 398 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding that matters of procedural
arbitrability are proper subjects for resolution by an arbitrator).
212. See Prudential Lines, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 704 F.2d 59, 64 (2d Cir. 1983); Fletcher
v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 619 N.E.2d 998, 1003 (N.Y. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 554
(1994).
213. Mercury Constr. Corp. v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 656 F.2d 933, 938-39
(4th Cir. 1981), aff'd, 460 U.S. 1 (1983); see also Progressive Casualty Ins. Co. v. C.A.
Reaseguradora Nacional De Vepezuela, 991 F.2d 42, 45 (2d Cir. 1993) (stating that
arbitration will be compelled where the parties have agreed to arbitrate and the agreement
covers the asserted claims). A second variation on this framework for analysis requires
a district court which has found a valid arbiration agreement to ascertain whether the
particular claim in dispute is barred from arbitration by federal or state law or policy. See
R.M. Perez & Assocs. v. Welch, 960 F.2d 534,538 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 628-30 (1985)).
214. See, e.g., Paine Webber, Inc. v. Hoffmann, 984 F.2d 1372, 1377 (3d Cir. 1993)
(citing AT&T Technologies v. Communication Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986)); Kelly
v. Merrill Lynch, 985 F.2d 1067, 1069 (11th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 600 (1994);
Republic of Nicaragua v. Standard Fruit Co., 937 F.2d 469,478 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 1294 (1992); Paine Webber v. Hartmann, 921 F.2d 507, 511 (3d Cir. 1990); see
also United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564,568 (1960) (holding that the
merits of a claim found to be arbitrable are to be decided by the arbitrator), cited in
AT&T Technologies, 475 U.S. at 648-50; Concourse Village v. Local 32E Serv. Employees
Int'l Union, 822 F.2d 302, 305 (2d Cir. 1987).
215. On the question of the validity and enforceability of such agreements, see John-
Edward Alley & Angela S. Oehler, The Arbitration of Age Discrimination Cases: Will
Clauses in Employment Contracts Be Enforced?, 65 FLA. B-J. 29 (Dec. 1991); Jennifer R.
Dowd, Enforcing Arbitration Agreements in Age Discrimination Suits: Gilmer v. Inter-
state/Johnson Lane Corp., 33 B.C. L. REv. 435 (1992); B. Scott Silverman, Enforceability
of Releases and Arbitration Agreements in Individual Employment Discrimination Cases,
in C742 A.L.I.-A.B.A. COURSE OF STuDY: EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AND CIVIL
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question that remains is whether an arguably frivolous claim of illegal
employment discrimination brought by a protected-group member is
within the scope of an arbitration mechanism intended to embrace
only employee statutory FEP claims. The relevant law of substantive
arbitrability leaves no doubt that the answer to this question is
"Yes.
, 216
2. The Law of Substantive Arbitrability Applied
The substantive arbitrability case law arising under the FAA (and
at times borrowed from the law of labor arbitration arising under the
Labor Management Relations Act) is replete with admonitions to the
trial courts that they are not to look to the merits of the controversy
underlying a petition to compel arbitration, even when the claim itself
appears to be frivolous.217 In deciding a petition to compel arbitra-
tion "the court is limited to ascertaining 'whether the party seeking
arbitration is making a claim which on its face is governed by the
contract [to arbitrate].... The courts ... have no business weighing
the merits of the [dispute].' ,,218 This decision rule produces "a
presumption of arbitrability in the sense that 'an order to arbitrate a
particular [claim] should not be denied unless it can be said with
positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an
interpretation that covers the asserted dispute.' "29 The presump-
RIGHTS ACIONS IN FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS 1091 (1992); Note, Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corporation: When Is an Employee's Right to a Judicial Forum
Precluded by an Arbitration Agreement?, 27 NEw ENG. L. REv. 791 (1993).
216. See supra notes 209-15; infra notes 217-22 and accompanying text.
217. Hoffinann, 984 F.2d at 1377 ("In resolving the arbitrability of particular claims,
however, 'a court is not to rule on the potential merits of the underlying claims,' no matter
how frivolous the claims may appear to the court." (quoting AT&T Technologies, 475 U.S.
at 649); Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 402-04 (1967);
Merrill Lynch, 985 F.2d at 1069 (11th Cir. 1993) (citing Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v.
Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 218 (1985)).
218. Bristol Farmers Mkt. & Auction Co. v. Arlen Realty, 589 F.2d 1214, 1217 (3d Cir.
1978) (quoting United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568 (1960)); see
also International Ass'n of Machinists v. Aloha Airlines, 790 F.2d 727, 731 (9th Cir.)
("When faced with a petition to compel arbitration, a court's role is limited to ascertaining
whether the party seeking arbitration is making a claim which on its face is governed by
the contract." (internal citations omitted)), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 931 (1986).
219. Hoffinann, 984 F.2d at 1377 (quoting AT&T Technologies, 475 U.S. at 649,
(internal citation omitted)); see also S+L+H S.p.A. v. Miller-St. Nazianz, Inc., 988 F.2d
1518,1524 (7th Cir. 1993) (stating as a presumption that arbitration is preferred unless the
court can state with "positive assurance" that the claim falls outside the scope of the
agreement) (citing International Ass'n of Machinists v. Fansteel, Inc., 900 F.2d 1005,1010(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 851 (1990)); Paine Webber v. Hartmann, 921 F.2d 507,511
(3d Cir. 1990) ("The sole issue is whether it may be said with 'positive assurance' that the
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tion of arbitrability is a strong one that can be "overcome only by a
definitive showing that the dispute in question is outside the coverage
of the arbitration clause."' If there is doubt as to the scope of
arbitrable issues under an agreement to arbitrate, those doubts
"should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at
hand is the construction of contract language itself, or-an allegation
of waiver, delay or a like defense to arbitrability." 1  Thus, the
cases make clear that the "federal substantive law of arbitrability
counsels 'that questions of arbitrability must be addressed with a
healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration.' "
Because of their status as members of a protected class under the
statutes that are the subject of the arbitration mechanism, even
dubious assertions by the protected-group members that their
statutory FEP rights have been abridged are matters that, on their
face, must be deemed within the scope of agreements to arbitrate
statutory FEP claims. The determination that such claims are
frivolous can be made only if the courts look to the merits of the
underlying controversies. Given the unequivocal judicial statements
as to the inappropriateness of judicial inquiry beyond the face of the
claim in arbitration, courts would be hard pressed to deny the
petitions of discharged protected-group members to compel arbitra-
tion on the basis of contentions by their employers that the underlying
discharges were in fact justified. Instead, judicial orders directing
employers to arbitrate would seem inevitable.
The prevailing law of commercial arbitration pertaining to
substantive arbitrability makes clear that, as the arbitration of
statutory FEP claims becomes commonplace, at-will employers
entering into arbitration agreements with their employees will find
that they are effectively compelled to arbitrate all claims of illegal
[particular] dispute falls outside the scope of the agreement [to arbitrate].").
220. Costle v. Fremont Indemnity Co., 839 F. Supp. 265, 272 (D. Vt. 1993) (citing
Associated Brick Mason Contractors, Inc. v. Harrington, 820 F.2d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 1987)).
221. Progressive Casualty Ins. Co. v. C.A. Reaseguradora Nacional De Venezuela, 991
F.2d 42, 48 (2d Cir. 1993); accord Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Solier Chrysler Plymouth,
Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985); Mercury Construction Corp. v. Moses H. Cone Memorial
Hospital, 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983); see also Hoffmann, 984 F.2d at 1377 (stating that
arbitrability is presumed "unless it can be said with positive assurance" that the arbitration
clause does not cover the dispute (quoting AT&T Technologies, 475 U.S. at 650)); Ritzel
Communications v. Mid-American Cellular Tel. Co., 989 F.2d 966, 968-69 (8th Cir. 1993)
(stating that "any doubts concerning waiver of arbitrability should be resolved in favor of
arbitration").
222. Progressive Casualty Ins., 991 F.2d at 48 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Solier
Chrysler Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985)).
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employment discrimination, whether frivolous or not, that are brought
by discharged protected-group members.'
B. At-Will Discharges of Protected-Group Members: Claims of
Pretext and the Emergence of a Discernable De Facto Just
Cause Standard
Because discharges claimed to be in violation of Title VII, the
ADEA, or the ADA will involve alleged acts of discrimination
against individual claimants, proper arbitral analysis of these dischar-
ges is almost certain to comport with the disparate treatment order
and allocation of proof paradigm 4 as articulated by the Supreme
Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,' Texas Department
of Community Affairs v. Burdine 6 and St. Mary's Honor Center v.
Hicks.' As demonstrated below, the advent of routine arbitral
application of the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine-Hicks paradigm will
have a significantly deleterious effect on the discretion of at-will
employers to terminate protected-group members for reasons not pro-
scribed by the FEP statutes. Today, in the judicial forum, at-wil
employers face the same. obligation to defend challenged discharges
223. See Dean Witter Reynolds v. McCoy, 995 F.2d 649, 650 (6th Cir. 1993) (per
curiam) ("Where the parties agree to submit any conflicts, breaches or other grievances
arising under a contract to an arbitrator, they are, naturally enough, bound by that
agreement....'2).
224. The cases cited in this sentence establish the Title VII disparate treatment
framework. The disparate treatment proof scheme under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act is the same as the Title VII framework. See Dister v. Continental
Group, Inc., 859 F.2d 1108, 1112 (2d Cir. 1988) ("Although the burden shifting set forth
in McDonnell Douglas arose and was refined in the context of employment discrimination
under Title VII, we have utilized the same methodology in the ADEA context.") (citations
omitted); see also DeMarco v. Holy Cross High Sch., 4 F.3d 166, 170-71 (2d Cir. 1993)
(discussing the application of the Title VII disparate treatment framework in an ADEA
case); Gagne v. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co., 881 F.2d 309,312-13 (6th Cir. 1989) (applying
the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine disparate treatment paradigm in an ADEA case);
Gemmell v. Fairchild Space & Defense Corp., 813 F. Supp. 1152 (D. Md. 1993). The
Gemmell court stated:
The proof scheme in Title VII cases, which has been adopted in ADEA
litigation, is well established. A plaintiff must first prove a prima facie case; the
defendant must then articulate a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the
challenged action; and plaintiff must then prove that the reason articulated by the
defendant is pretextual.
Id. at 1156. The clear focus of the ADA proscription of discrimination against qualified
individuals with disabilities is on the disparate treatment plane. Therefore, its seems likely
that the Title VIIJADEA scheme will also be adopted under the ADA.
225. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
226. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
227. 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).
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of protected-group members that they will confront when a discharged
employee brings a claim in arbitration asserting that her statutory
FEP rights have been abridged. However, at present the true impact
of the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine-Hicks standard is blunted because
only a relatively small number of potential statutory FEP claims reach
trial and advance to judgment.
It seems certain that when discharged protected-group members
are provided with an adjudicatory option like arbitration-which
involves less cost, complexity, and a much shorter time to judgment
than a traditional lawsuit-many more of them will challenge termi-
nations they believe to be unfair.' Thus, the full effect of the
disparate treatment order and allocation of proof paradigm on the
discretion of at-will employers to terminate protected-group members
for reasons not proscribed by statute will become apparent only with
the widespread adjudication of statutory FEP claims through
arbitration. The rationale for that contention is set forth below.
An examination of the manner in which the McDonnell Douglas
framework will be applied in arbitration best illustrates the broad
effects anticipated. Consider, for example, an African-American male
who challenges his discharge by an at-will employer, claiming he was
terminated because of his race and color in violation of the Title VII
bar on employment discrimination. 9 Under the disparate treat-
ment paradigm, "[t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact
that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff
remains at all times with the plaintiff."'  Thus, in arbitration our
hypothetical, the claimant first must establish a prima facie case of
disparate treatment by proving by a preponderance of the evidence:
(i) that he is a protected-group member (here a nonwhite or non-
Caucasian); (ii) that he was qualified for the job he held at the time
of his discharge; (iii) that despite his qualifications, he was discharged;
228. Besides the surge in arbitration of statutory fair employment practice claims
expected from protected-group members pursuing a more efficient means to vindicate their
rights, companies are increasingly demanding mandatory arbitration of discrimination
claims. See, e.g., Margaret A. Jacobs, Woman Claims Arbiters of Bias Are Biased, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 19, 1994, at B1 (noting that "[flollowing [Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane,
500 U.S. 20 (1991)], at least 100 large corporations have required employees to sign
mandatory arbitration clauses").
229. There exists also, of course, the prospect of meritorious employee claims based on
Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. The authors defer specifically addressing
such claims at this point in the Article to preserve our focus on Title VII, but will briefly
return to Section 1981 near the conclusion of the substantive analysis. See infra notes 287-
94 and accompanying text.
230. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
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and (iv) that after he was discharged, the job he formerly held
remained open (i.e., his job was not eliminated)?3
The burden placed on the disparate treatment plaintiff at the
prima facie step is "not onerous." 2 Presuming he was qualified for
the job he held at the time of his termination, our hypothetical
African-American dischargee would have little difficulty meeting the
prima facie case threshold. If the prima facie case is made out by the
claimant employee, the burden of moving forward with the evidence
shifts to the defendant-employer3 3
The employer's burden at the next stage "is to rebut the
presumption of discrimination [raised by the prima facie case] by
producing evidence that the [claimant's termination] ... was for a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason."'  Because the ultimate
burden of persuasion remains with the claimant-employee, the
employer need not convince the arbitrator that, the challenged
termination was actually motivated by the reason(s) it proffers."5
Nevertheless, the relative ease with which our hypothetical African-
American dischargee can make out a prima facie case of employment
discrimination crystallizes a very important dimension of the second
broad interaction effect.
At-will employers that discharge protected-group members and
are subsequently called to task in the arbitral forum invariably will be
required to step forward and articulate, and offer evidence to support,
legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for those discharges. The
reason(s) for discharge articulated by the employer at step two will
frame the remainder of the arbitrator's analysis by providing the
starting point for the claimant's pretext proof at step three of the
disparate treatment framework.36  Therefore, "the employer's
explanation must be 'clear and specific.' "'
231. See id. at 254 n.6 (citing McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
232. Id. at 253.
233. ld.
234. Id. at 254.
235. Id.
236. Manzer v. Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co., 29 F.3d 1078,1082 (6th Cir. 1994) ("In
Burdine, the Supreme Court noted that the employer's explanations serve to 'frame the
factual issue with sufficient clarity so that the plaintiff will have a full and fair opportunity
to demonstrate pretext.' " (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255-56)).
237. Dister v. Continental Group, Inc., 859 F.2d 1108 (2d. Cir. 1988) (quoting Meiri v.
Dacon, 759 F.2d 989, 996-97 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 474 U.S. 829 (1985)). The Dister court
stated:
[Tihe [employer's] burden of production frames the factual issue with sufficient
clarity to afford the employee a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate pretext.
1995]
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If the employer in our hypothetical is unable to produce credible
evidence that the challenged discharge was for a legitimate, nondis-
criminatory reason, the presumption of illegal discrimination raised by
the claimant employee's prima facie case will stand and the employer
will be found in violation of Title VII. If the employer does articulate
and offer credible evidence to support a legitimate nondiscriminatory
reason for the challenged discharge, the employee can prevail only if
he convinces the arbitrator that the reason(s) proffered by the
employer for his discharge is unworthy of belief (i.e., is a pretext) and
that a discriminatory reason more likely than not motivated the
employer."8
Even if the employer is able to articulate and offer evidence of
a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged discharge,
the claimant-employee is almost certain to allege that the proffered
reason for discharge was a pretext for illegal discrimination. If that
occurs, the arbitrator will be obliged to move to the third step of the
McDonnell Douglas paradigm and weigh the reasons cited by the
employer against the claimant's pretext proof and any evidence the
claimant may offer as to the employer's intent to discriminate. It is
at this point that the de facto just cause inquiry inherent in the
disparate treatment framework will ensue.
The inquiry that takes place at the third step of the disparate
treatment paradigm in Title VII/ADEA discharge cases differs only
in degree from the arbitral analysis in discharge cases governed by
collective bargaining agreements that require terminations to be for
just or proper cause. As applied in the labor arbitration forum, the
just cause standard requires employers to convince the arbitrator that
a challenged termination was prompted by good business reasons
To this end, the employer's explanation of its reasons must be clear and specific.
Were vague or conclusory averments of good faith sufficient to satisfy the
employer's burden, Title VII employees seeking to demonstrate pretext would
be unfairly handicapped.
Id. at 1115 (citations omitted).
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typically linked to the employee's workplace conduct. 9  It pre-
cludes discharge based on illegitimate reasons or for "mere whim or
caprice. '
But for the 1993 opinion of the Supreme Court in Saint Mary's
Honor Center v. Hicks, the arbitrator's rejection of the employer's
proffered reason for discharge (and the inference of pretext that
conclusion raises) would routinely result in a reversal of the discharge.
Even under the post-Hicks disparate treatment order and allocation
of proof regime, which now requires at the third step a finding of an
illegal discriminatory motive independent of the pretext inference,24'
acceptance of the claimant employee's pretext claim will, at the very
least, open the door to an inference of illegal discrimination. Hicks
teaches that the prima facie case, plus proof that the employer's
articulated reasons for discharge were false, provide the evidentiary
basis for "a suspicion of mendacity" by the arbitrator that permits the
inference of illegal discrimination.2 42
239. See generally FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA ASPER ELKOURI, How ARBrrRATION
WORKS 650-707 (BNA 4th ed. 1985) (discussing labor arbitrator's application of the just
cause standard); FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA ASPER ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS,
1985-89 at 170-204 (BNA Cum. Supp. 1991) (same).
240. ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 239, at 652-53 (quoting Worthington Corp. v.
United EIec., Radio, & Mach. Workers of America, Local 259,24 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA)
1, 6-7 (1955)).
241. In St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993), the Court stated:
The defendant's "production" (whatever its persuasive effect) having been made,
the trier of fact proceeds to decide the ultimate question: whether plaintiff has
proven "that the defendant intentionally discriminated against him" because of
his race. The factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant
(particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may,
together with the elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional
discrimination. Thus, rejection of the defendant's proffered reasons, will permit
the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination, and the
court of appeals was correct when it noted that, upon such rejection, "[n]o addi-
tional proof of discrimination is required." But the court of appeals' holding
that rejection of the defendant's proffered reasons compels judgment for the
plaintiff disregards the fundamental principle of Rule 301 that a presumption
does not shift the burden of proof, and ignores our repeated admonition that the
Title VII plaintiff at all times bears the "ultimate burden of persuasion."
Id. at 2749 (citations omitted); see also Neely, supra note 238, at 7153 (asserting that Hicks
still permits, but does not mandate, a finding of discrimination based on a finding of
pretext alone).
242. Manzer v. Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co., 29 F.3d 1078, 1083 (6th Cir. 1994)
(citing Hicks, 113 S.Ct. at 2749); see also Armbruster v. Unisys Corp., 65 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 828, 839 (3d Cir. 1994). The Armbruster court stated:
"[t]he factfinder's disbelief of [the employer's explanation] may, together with the
elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination"
because it allows the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional
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Certainly, as the employer's articulated defense of its actions
moves further away from demonstrably legitimate work- or perfor-
mance-related bases, the probability that the arbitrator will find the
employer's explanation of the challenged discharge unworthy of belief
increases, making more likely the inference of an intentional act of
discrimination.243 Thus, the rationality of the employer's proffered
reason(s) for discharge is probative of the question of whether those
reasons are a pretext for illegal discrimination.2" Idiosyncratic or
questionable explanations of the reason for discharge make it easier
for the plaintiff to prove pretext. 245 Convincing arguments by the
claimant employee that the reason for discharge proffered by the
employer is "implausible, absurd or unwise,"246 or "so riddled with
error that the [employer] could not honestly have relied on it,"'247
will propel the arbitrator substantially toward a finding of illegal
discrimination.
In the end, arbitral inquiry will focus on whether the employee's
work performance met his employer's legitimate expectations 8  If
the claimant-dischargee proves that those legitimate expectations were
reasonably met, or that the employer's expectations were illegitimate,
arbitrary or unreasonable,24 9 it becomes more difficult for the
arbitrator to conclude that the employer's decision to discharge was
discrimination. After [Hicks] it seems clear, however, that the trier of fact cannot
find for the plaintiff merely because it disbelieves the [employer's] proffered
explanation; it must also be persuaded that the employment decision was the
result of the bias that can be inferred from the falsity of the defendant's
explanation.
Id. (quoting Hicks, 113 S.Ct at 2749).
243. See, e.g., Bishopp v. District of Columbia, 788 F.2d 781,787,789 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
("[A] defendanti [employer's] reliance on subjective as opposed to objective factors
requires a court to employ heightened scrutiny.... [A] blatantly pretextual defense carries
the seeds of its own destruction."); Lanphear v. Prokop, 703 F.2d 1311, 1317 (D.C. Cir.
1983) (holding, pre-Hicks, that an unsubstantiated employer claim that a discharge was for
poor performance, rebutted by plaintiff's proof to the contrary, warranted reversal of a
district court judgment in favor of the employer, without need for remand); see also Neely,
supra note 238, at 7152-53 (arguing that the showing of pretext can suffice to prove
discrimination if it persuades the finder of fact that discrimination was the real reason for
the decision to discharge).
244. Meiri v. Dacon, 759 F.2d 989, 997, n.13 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 829 (1985)
(quoting Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1012 n.6 (1st Cir. 1979)).
245. Loeb, 600 F.2d at 1012 n.6.
246. DeMarco v. Holy Cross High Sch., 4 F.3d 166, 171 (2d Cir. 1993).
247. Lieberman v. Gant, 630 F.2d 60, 65 (2d Cir. 1980).
248. Huhn v. Koehring Co., 718 F.2d 239, 244 (7th Cir. 1983); accord Meiri, 759 F.2d
at 995.
249. See Kephart v. Institute of Gas Technology, 630 F.2d 1217, 1223 (7th Cir. 1980)
(discussing the plaintiff's obligation at the third step of the disparate treatment paradigm)..
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nonetheless not a product of illegal discrimination. Arguably, the
showing of pretext frequently will be sufficient to make out a Title
VII violation because it will persuade the arbitrator that discrimina-
tion was the real reason for the challenged discharge.25
Thus, an arbitral finding that the articulated reason for discharge
is not worthy of belief will place the employer's case in great peril.
Because the three steps of the disparate treatment paradigm are
interdependent,' a suspect reason advanced by the employer at
step two that is effectively discredited by the claimant employee at
step three will lead many arbitrators to conclude that, in light of the
claimant's prima facie proof at step one, the employer's decision to
discharge was motivated by an illegal discriminatory intent. As a
result, in many. cases where the employer is not able to identify a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for a challenged discharge,
application of the three-step disparate treatment paradigm will result
in a reversal of the discharge. This is the same outcome reached in
conventional labor arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement
when an arbitrator finds no just cause for a challenged discharge 2
Thus, over time, employer-employee agreements to arbitrate statutory
FEP claims will bring to the fore the de facto just cause standard
inherent in the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine-Hicks disparate treatment
paradigm, thereby effectively granting protected-group members some
250. See Neely, supra note 238, at 7152-53. Because the modification in the disparate
treatment paradigm worked by Hicks is of substantial nuance, it is also possible that some
arbitrators (and juries) will find it difficult to fully grasp and may therefore place undue
emphasis on the pretext analysis.
251. Meiri, 759 F.2d at 997 n.12. The Second Circuit cautioned: "Although the courts
have fashioned a tripartite construct to evaluate Title VII claims, we must withstand the
temptation to treat each stage as an independent inquiry. Indeed, the efficacy of
employment discrimination law depends upon the interdependence of the prima facie case,
the employer's rebuttal and proof of pretext."
Id. (citing Lieberman v. Gant, 630 F.2d 60, 66-67 (2d Cir. 1980)).
252. There is one significant difference between the just cause analysis that transpires
in labor arbitration and the de facto just cause analysis under the McDonnell Douglas-
Burdine-Hicks disparate treatment paradigm. Pursuant to a long-standing principle of
labor arbitration, the employer bears the burden of proving that a challenged discharge
is for just cause in cases arbitrated under collective bargaining agreements. See
FAIRWEATHER'S PRACrICE AND PROCEDURE IN LABOR ARBITRATION 194-95 (Ray J.
Schoonhoven ed., 3d ed. 1991) ("In a discharge case, it is usually assumed that the
Company has the burden of proving a reasonable cause for the discharge under the
contract.. . ." (quoting American Maize Prods. Co., v. Oil, Chem., & Atomic workers, Int'l
Union, Local 7-210, 39 Lab. Arb. Rep. 1165, 1168 (McGury 1963))); see also MARVIN
HILL, JR. & ANTHONY V. SINICROPI, EVIDENCE IN ARBITRATION 13 (BNA 1980) ("As
a general practice,. . . in disciplinary cases the burden is on management both to proceed
first with its evidence and to prove employee guilt or wrongdoing.").
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measure of insulation from discharge for nonmeritorious reasons not
in violation of FEP law.
Because it is inherent in the disparate treatment framework, this
de facto just cause protection for protected-group members can be
said to exist today under the various FEP statutes. However, that fact
is apparent only to the trained legal mind and cannot easily be
ascertained from a jury verdict.3 In contrast, when arbitration of
the challenged discharges of protected-group members becomes a
routine event those frequent adjudications will reveal a workplace
principle, discernible to all employees, whereby only terminations sup-
ported by just cause-legitimate, credible, business-related
reason(s)-will be sustained.' That pattern, and the phenomenon
underlying it, will create in the minds of protected-group members the
same type of reasonable expectation of fair treatment in discharge
matters that is generally deemed to constitute an enforceable implied-
in-fact term of employment. 5
Having to explain and defend large numbers of termination
actions to neutral third-party arbitrators will be a new experience for
at-will employers. In many cases that are advanced to arbitration, at-
will employers that cannot demonstrate the existence of sound,
business-related reasons for the challenged terminations of protected-
group members will find their at-will discretion eviscerated. As a
result of this phenomenon, the de facto just cause guarantee accruing
to protected-group members will manifest itself.
The discussion of the third category of broad interaction effects,
those pertaining to nonprotected-group members, is more speculative
in nature. Nevertheless, it could prove to be the most significant result
253. In this regard, the authors note that their review of the relevant literature reveals
no previous identification of the de facto just cause construct.
254. This phenomenon is particularly likely to occur if arbitrators, following the practice
of labor arbitrators in disputes arising under collective bargaining agreements, articulate
the rationale for their awards in written, substantive arbitration awards.
255. Though it is not the subject of this inquiry, it seems clear that, through operation
of the disparate treatment paradigm, members of the traditional FEP protected groups also
would be afforded a form of de facto protection against demotion, denial of promotion,
transfer, layoff, and other adverse personnel actions for which the employer was unable
to demonstrate sound business justification. The incremental interference in the discretion
presently enjoyed by at-will employers in personnel-related matters worked by this
phenomenon will be considerable. It is an important additional factor for at-will
employers to weigh in deciding whether to enter into agreements with employees to
arbitrate statutory FEP claims. The third broad interaction identified and discussed below
addresses the question of whether this implied-in-fact employment term can be limited to
protected-group members. See infra notes 256-94 and accompanying text.
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of the interaction between the EAWD and employer-employee agree-
ments to arbitrate statutory FEP claims.
C. At-Will Discharges of Ostensively Nonprotected Group
Members: When the Employer Refuses to Arbitrate
A troubling concern will arise if implementation of employer-
employee agreements to arbitrate statutory FEP claims does indeed
afford individuals who are clearly protected-class members216 the
right to challenge all discharges through arbitration under a de facto
just cause standard. Under this scenario, only those individuals falling
outside the traditional protected groups-nondisabled Caucasian
males under forty years of age-will be denied the opportunity to
take issue with terminations they believe to have been unfair.
This potential exclusion of Caucasian males from an employment
right accorded all other individuals is ironic indeed. However, it is
the natural result of the public policy decision, alluded to at the outset
of this article, to forego statutorily protecting all employees against
unjust discharge and instead to guarantee equal employment
opportunity to certain insular groups who in the past have been
denied equal treatment. This public policy decision, coupled with a
disparate treatment paradigm that permits the inference of illegal
discriminatory discharge to be based in substantial part, or even
entirely, on the absence of evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for termination, transforms the statutory protection against
unequal treatment into a de facto just cause guarantee that is
extended only to protected-group members. Thus, a public policy
founded on a desire to protect insular, traditionally disfavored groups
eventually will lead to a circumstance in which only the members of
the formerly "favored" composite group (hereinafter for simplicity,
"Caucasian males") are excluded from just cause protection and the
right to challenge their discharges.
At-will employers cannot ignore the potential ramifications of a
workplace due process regime that draws so clear a distinction be-
tween the discharge appeals rights of protected-group members and
their nonprotected-group member peers. The question for contempla-
tion is whether at-will employers will be able to continue to discharge
nonprotected-group members for any reason and then refuse to arbi-
256. Those protected classes include nonwhites, non-Caucasians, women, the members
of ethnic or religious minority groups, persons over 40 years of age, and qualified
individuals with a disability. See supra note 2.
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trate their challenges to termination, when they are obligated to
arbitrate under a de facto just cause standard virtually all challenged
discharges of protected-group members.
This question will arise in two contexts. First, there is the more
narrowly drawn issue of whether ostensively nonprotected-group
members can compel their at-will employers to arbitrate challenged
discharges by claiming that those terminations were the result of
illegal discrimination. The second issue is more fundamental in
nature: Is it permissible under Title VII disparate treatment theory
and disparate impact theory, as well as under section 1981 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, for at-will employers to implement an employ-
ment policy that effectively extends to traditionally protected-group
members the right to arbitrate virtually all challenged discharges and
other adverse employment actions when that same right is not
afforded nonprotected-group members? Each issue is addressed in
turn below.
1. The Ability of Nonprotected-Group Members to Compel the
Arbitration of Their Wrongful Discharge Claims
At-will employers that agree to arbitrate statutory FEP claims
should not be surprised if substantial numbers of nonprotected-group
members who believe they have been unfairly discharged attempt to
emulate their protected-group member peers by filing claims under
the arbitration mechanism, alleging they have been subjected to illegal
employment discrimination. At-will employers are certain to resist
such efforts. Employers can be expected to assert that nonprotected
members are without "standing" under employer-employee agree-
ments to arbitrate statutory FEP claims because their interests are not
embraced by the various equal employment opportunity statutes, and
that their claims of illegal discrimination therefore are patently
frivolous and substantively nonarbitrable. When that assertion is
made by at-will employers, nonprotected-group members will be
obliged to petition an appropriate court for enforcement of the
agreement to arbitrate.
In a manner similar to that described earlier with regard to
protected-group members, 7 a Caucasian male petitioning for
judicial enforcement of an employer-employee agreement to arbitrate
statutory FEP claims will be required to demonstrate that the
challenge he brings is within the scope of the arbitration agreement.
257. See supra notes 208-23 and accompanying text.
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As with the claim brought by the African-American male in the first
hypothetical posited above,' 8 the key to securing "standing" under
the arbitration mechanism for our Caucasian male dischargee would
be proving his status as a protected-group member under the FEP
statutes that are the subject of the procedure. Despite the apparent
futility of an attempt by an ostensively nonprotected-group member
to prove that his termination was in violation of FEP law, at-will
employers nevertheless will be obliged to convince the petitioned
court that the challenged discharge is not a proper subject for
arbitration. The relevant case law indicates two schools of thought in
this regard.
a. The Literal Reading of McDonald
The first, most direct approach relies squarely on the admonition
by the Supreme Court in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation
Company"59 that the racial discrimination claims of whites and
blacks are to be evaluated "upon the same standards."2" McDonald
can be read to establish that a Caucasian male dischargee could
demonstrate his standing to bring a claim of illegal discrimination
under the arbitration mechanism merely by asserting that, because he
has a color, a race, a gender, a national origin, or a religion, he should
be deemed a protected-group member under Title VII.261' If this
literal view of the first element of the prima facie case eventually
were to become the norm, terminated Caucasian males would always
be able to achieve arbitral review of their discharges merely by
alleging illegal discrimination.
b. The "Prima Facie Plus" Standard
The second approach to evaluating the protected-group status of
a Caucasian male claimant is best exemplified by several opinions of
258. See supra notes 228-56 and accompanying text.
259. 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
260. Id. at 280.
261. Wilson v. Bailey, 934 F.2d 301, 304 (11th Cir. 1991) (applying the McDonnell
Douglas test of a prima facie case, which "requires a reverse discrimination plaintiff to
prove: (1) that he belongs to a class; (2) that he applied for and was qualified for a job;
(3) that he was rejected for the job; and (4) that the job was filled by a minority group
member or a woman."); Lucas v. Dole, 835 F.2d 532, 534 n.9 (4th Cir. 1987) ("Title VII
prohibits discrimination in employment against whites and 'the same standards are
applicable in both instances.' " (citing BUtta v. Anne Arundel County, 473 F. Supp. 83,
86 (D. Md. 1979))); Daye v. Harris, 655 F.2d 258, 262 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("That [the
plaintiff] is white is no impediment to this suit; white employees are protected by Title
VII." (citing McDonald, 427 U.S. at 280)).
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the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit. In evaluating the prima facie case of Caucasian male
plaintiffs, the D.C. Circuit requires incremental proof of protected-
group status beyond that called for by the McDonnell Douglas
disparate treatment paradigm. For example, the court has required
evidence of
background circumstances [to] support the suspicion that the
defendant is that unusual employer who discriminates
against the majority. In other words, to repeat the Burdine
formulation, [the Caucasian male plaintiff] must show that
he "was rejected under circumstances which [despite his
majority status] give rise to an inference of unlawful discrim-
ination."262
In another case, the D.C. Circuit stated that "white males, who as a
group historically have not been hindered in the workplace because
of their race or sex, are required to offer other particularized
evidence, apart from their race or sex, that suggests some reason why
an employer might discriminate against them."'2 63
In applying this standard, the D.C. Circuit has looked to a
number of factors. The use of subjective instead of objective criteria
in arriving at a personnel action decision;2 4 evidence of pressure to
favor, or irregular acts of favoritism towards minority employees;26
unlawful employer conduct in the past;2" and practices inconsistent
with normal, customary procedure267 all have been deemed to satisfy
the additional burden imposed by the D.C. Circuit on the atypical
Title VII plaintiff
If confronted with the "prima facie case plus" standard utilized
by the D.C. Circuit, a Caucasian male dischargee would not be able
to access the arbitration procedure merely by asserting that because
he has a color, race, and gender he is a protected-group member
under Title VII. Instead, he would be required to adduce reliable
evidence to establish that his discharge was likely the result of what
262. Lanphear v. Prokop, 703 F.2d 1311,1315 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (restating the McDonnell
Douglas standard for a prima facie case) (internal citations omitted); see also Lucas, 835
F.2d at 534 n.9 (describing the D.C. Circuit's stricter burden of proof in reverse
discrimination cases); Daye, 655 F.2d at 263 (rejecting racial discrimination claim of white
plaintiff for failure to satisfy heightened standard of proof).
263. Bishopp v. District of Columbia, 788 F.2d 781,786 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cited in Lucas,
835 F.2d at 534 n.9.
264. Lanphear, 703 F.2d at 1315.
265. Id.; see also Machakos v. Meese, 647 F. Supp. 1253, 1262 (D.D.C. 1986).
266. Parker v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 652 F.2d 1012, 1018 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
267. Id. at 1017.
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is commonly dubbed "reverse discrimination"-an assertion that he
was terminated when similarly situated, traditional Title VII protect-
ed-group members who committed the same act(s) were not, or a
claim that his discharge was effected to facilitate hiring or advancing
an African-American, a woman, or other protected-group mem-
ber.26
It is the understandable desire of at-will employers to avoid
arbitrating frivolous claims of illegal employment discrimination
brought by discharged nonprotected-group members that makes the
D.C. Circuit's augmented prima facie case threshold for nonprotected-
group members attractive. That a nonprotected-group member who
succeeds in reaching arbitration with a truly vacuous claim of illegal
discrimination is almost certain to have his claim rejected by the
arbitrator further supports this approach to limiting access to the
arbitral forum.
Despite its attractiveness, there is a problem with using the D.C.
Circuit's standard as a device for winnowing out frivolous claims by
nonprotected-group members through substantive arbitrability
challenges. That problem lies in the fact that applying the D.C.
Circuit's construct would require a court at least to glance at and
evaluate the factual allegations underlying the claimant's
discrimination charge in order to ascertain if there are "background
circumstances" or "particularized evidence" indicating that despite his
majority status, there is reason to infer that an illegal act of
discrimination has occurred. As shown earlier, however, the
prevailing law of commercial arbitration pertaining to substantive
arbitrability determinations precludes such an examination of the facts
of the underlying dispute.O9
The lack of a device under existing commercial arbitration law
for precluding nonmembers of the traditional protected groups from
forcing arbitration of frivolous, clearly baseless claims of illegal
268. The Sixth and Tenth Circuits also apply a type of "prima facie plus" standard. See
Notari v. Denver Water Dept., 971 F.2d 585,589 (10th Cir. 1992) ("[A] Title VII disparate
treatment plaintiff who pursues a reverse discrimination claim... must, in lieu of showing
that he belongs to a protected group, establish background circumstances that support an
inference that the defendant is one of those unusual employers who discriminates against
the majority."); Livingston v. Roadway Express, Inc., 802 F.2d 1250, 1252 (10th Cir. 1986)
("[I]n [disparate] impact cases.... a member of a favored group must show background
circumstances supporting the inference that a facially neutral policy with a disparate impact
is in fact a vehicle for unlawful discrimination."); Murray v. Thistledown Racing Club, Inc.,
770 F.2d 63, 67 (6th Cir. 1985).
269. See supra notes 217-23 and accompanying text.
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employment discrimination is likely to propel the federal judiciary to
revisit the existing standards for deciding issues of substantive
arbitrability within this narrow, esoteric context. To prevent the
wholesale and largely futile arbitration of specious claims, a limited
fine tuning of the law of commercial arbitration pertaining to substan-
tive arbitrability consistent with the approach of the D.C. Circuit
would be warranted.
Regardless of whether the law of substantive arbitrability is
refined in this manner, Caucasian male dischargees who are not in
fact the subjects of illegal reverse discrimination will find no satisfac-
tion in the arbitral forum. The discretion of the at-will employer to
discharge nonprotected-group members will remain intact. For that
reason, over time only ostensively nonprotected-group members who
advance colorable claims of reverse discrimination will be able to
challenge effectively their discharges under agreements to arbitrate
statutory FEP claims.
Thus, it is probable that with the maturation and institutionaliza-
tion of the arbitration of statutory FEP claims, employees falling
outside of the traditional FEP protected groups will be largely
excluded from the right to challenge their discharges in arbitration
under a de facto just cause standard. This analysis now turns to the
potential legal implications of that prospective state of affairs.
2. The Legality of a Bifurcated Discharge Appeals Regime
Because of the manner in which the protected groups under the
ADEA and the ADA are defined, refusals by at-will employers to
arbitrate the discharges of nondisabled persons under forty years of
age should not raise meaningful questions of violations of either
statute. The protection of the ADEA extends only to persons forty
years of age or older. The statute does not afford protection to
persons under forty years of agel 0 Similarly, the ADA shields only
qualified individuals with a disability." The statute does not afford
270. The ADEA protects "individuals who are at least 40 years of age." 29 U.S.C. §
631(a) (1988).
271. The ADA states that "[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified
individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job
application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee
compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment."
42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (Supp. V 1993). The ADA further defines a "qualified individual
with a disability" as "an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such
individual holds or desires." Id. § 12111(8).
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protection to persons who are not disabled. Accordingly, discharged
employees who are nonprotected-group members under the ADEA
and the ADA cannot assert that disparate treatment based on their
youth or their physical and mental fitness is inconsistent with those
statutory schemes.
In contrast, the manner in which the five Title VII protected
groups are defined results in the statutory protection cutting in two
directions (e.g., non-Caucasian/Caucasian, black/white, female/male,
etc.). Accordingly, there always exists a possibility that any course of
employer conduct that distinguishes employment-related rights on the
basis of the employee's race, color, sex, national origin, or religion
("majority" or "minority" group status) will be deemed illegal 2
The dual ,nature of the Title VII discrimination bars gives rise to the
possibility that at-will employers choosing to arbitrate the statutory
FEP claims of Title VII protected-group members, but refusing to
arbitrate the challenged discharges of Title VII nonprotected-group
members, may run afoul of the statuteY3
In McDonald, the Supreme Court emphasized the "Congressional
mandate [to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission] to
eliminate all practices which operate to disadvantage the employment
opportunities of any group protected by Title VII, including Cauca-
sians."' 4 The McDonald Court went on to note the "uncontradict-
ed legislative history to the effect that Title VII was intended to
'cover white men and white women and all Americans.' "275 Ac-
cordingly, examination of the disparate treatment and disparate
impact paradigms is warranted to determine whether a bifurcated
arbitration mechanism that gives one category of at-will employ-
ees-those within the traditional Title VII protected groups-the right
272. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986). The court, in a sex
discrimination (sexual harassment) case, stated: "[T]he language of Title VII is not limited
to 'economic' or 'tangible' discrimination. The phrase 'terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment' evinces a congressional intent to 'strike at the entire spectrum of disparate
treatment of men and women' in employment." Id. (quoting Los Angeles Dept. of Water
& Power v. Manhart, 455 U.S. 702,707 n.13 (1978) (quoting Sprogis v. United Air Lines,
Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971))).
273. See supra notes 180-81 and accompanying text.
274. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 279-80 (1976); see also
Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66-67 (finding that sexual harassment falls within the ambit of Title
VII's protection against hostile work environments).
275. McDonald, 427 U.S. at 280. In holding that Title VII affords the same protection
against racial discrimination to whites that it provides to blacks, the McDonald Court
found a claim of racial discrimination by two discharged white employees to be
"indistinguishable from [the claim of racial discrimination brought in] McDonnell
Douglas." Id.
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to arbitrate all challenged discharges under a de facto just cause
standard, while denying the same to the remaining employ-
ees-Caucasian males-constitutes a "practiceU which operate[s] to
disadvantage" that latter group in violation of Title VII.276
a. The Title VII Disparate Treatment Analysis
The key to a disparate treatment claim is proof of the employer's
discriminatory motive. While the claimant dischargee must prove dis-
criminatory intent by the employer, such intent "can in some
situations be inferred from the mere fact of differences in treat-
ment.
277
It is unlikely that the Caucasian male dischargee in our earlier
hypothetical, who brings a suit alleging a Title VII violation arising
from his employer's refusal to arbitrate his discrimination claim,
would be able to prove, through direct evidence, that the employer's
refusal was motivated by an intent to disadvantage the dischargee
personally, or persons of his color, race, and gender generally.
Regardless, since the plaintiff in a Title VII case is not required
to adduce direct proof of discrimination,278 and needs to establish by
circumstantial or other evidence only that "[t]he employer simply
treats some people less favorably than others because of their race,
color, religion, sex or national origin," 279 the specter of a finding of
illegal disparate treatment cannot be lightly dismissed. A convincing
argument can be made that effectively allocating the right to
challenge discharge actions through arbitration along race, color and
gender lines constitutes "treat[ing] some people less favorably than
others because of their race, color... [or] sex." 280
276. In order to simplify this portion of the analysis, we will discuss only differential
treatment of white males on the basis of race and sex.
277. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15 (1977)
(cited in Holder v. City of Raleigh, 867 F.2d 823, 826 (4th Cir. 1989); Metz v. Transit Mix,
Inc., 828 F.2d 1202, 1204 (7th Cir.'1987); Donoghue v. County of Orange, 828 F.2d 1432,
1438-39 (9th Cir. 1987); Zahorik v. Cornell Univ., 729 F.2d 85, 91-92 (2d Cir. 1984); Davis
v. Califano, 613 F.2d 957, 961-62 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
278. United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714 n.3
(1983); see also Lucas v. Dole, 835 F.2d 532, 533 (4th Cir. 1987) (stating that a Title VII
plaintiff's prima facie case may be established by direct or indirect evidence of discrimina-
tion); Lynch v. Freeman, 817 F.2d 380, 382 (6th Cir. 1987) (stating that direct evidence of
discrimnatory intent is not required to establish a Title VII claim); Zahorik, 729 F.2d at
91-92 (stating that discriminatory motive may be established by circumstantial evidence);
cf. Krause v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 910 F.2d 674, 677 (10th Cir. 1990) (applying principle
that plaintiff need not adduce direct proof of discrimination to ADEA case).




The outcome here will turn on the application of the McDonnell
Douglas-Burdine-Hicks disparate treatment framework, including the
gloss added by McDonald and its progeny. McDonald makes clear
that a Caucasian male, who is otherwise qualified for the job he held
at the time of his termination, would be able to clear the "prima facie
case" hurdle by claiming that his employment opportunities (here the
right to seek arbitral review of his discharge) have been limited
because of his race, color, or gender." 1 Thus, the critical analysis
will occur at the second and third steps of the disparate treatment
paradigm.
An obvious legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason the employer
could advance at step two of the disparate treatment paradigm is that
the arbitration mechanism is beyond the reach of 'Caucasian males
because it is intended only to provide a.means for resolving claims of
illegal employment discrimination by "minorities"-those traditionally
viewed as falling within the five Title VII protected groups. Assum-
ing that such an assertion would be sufficient to shift the focus to step
three of the disparate treatment paradigm, the question becomes
whether the finder of fact could be persuaded that the true reason for
the employer's refusal to arbitrate the Caucasian male plaintiff's
challenge to his discharge was a desire to deny him the same de facto
just cause guarantee and right to appeal his discharge to a neutral
third party afforded traditional protected-group members. If that
inference of pretext were drawn, it would take no great leap of
judicial logic to find that by knowingly denying the Caucasian male
plaintiff the same just cause protection and discharge appeals right
afforded traditional protected-group members, the employer intended
to discriminate against him because of his race, color, and gender.
The uncertainty caused by the lack of specific guidance in the
Title VII case law with regard to this matter should give at-will
employers pause. It seems probable that an employer policy, even a
de facto one, that establishes two discharge-related due process
regimes as widely divergent as those described above-one for
obvious Title VII protected-group members and a second for
Caucasian males-would be viewed by the courts with suspicion.
Even more reason for concern, and perhaps also a more certain
answer to the legality of such a bifurcated discharge appeals regime,
is found when this scenario is evaluated within the context of the
281. See supra note 261 and accompanying text.
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framework for analyzing Title VII disparate impact claims set forth in
the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
b. The Title VII Disparate Impact Analysis
In Title VII disparate impact cases-those involving a claim that
one or more of the employer's employment practices has resulted in
a pattern or practice of discrimination against protected-group
members-the plaintiff need not prove an intent to discriminate.
Instead, pursuant to the framework for analyzing disparate impact
cases set forth by the language of section 703(k)(1)(A)(i) of Title
VII,' as amended by section 105 of the Civil Rights Act of
1991, a violation of Title VII is made out when the plaintiff
"demonstrates that the [employer] uses a particular employment prac-
tice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin and the [employer] fails to demonstrate that
the challenged practice is job related for the position and consistent
with business necessity."'  It seems likely that the term
"employment practice" is elastic enough to embrace an employer-
initiated procedure for arbitrating statutory FEP claims. If it is, the
employer's predicament is quickly revealed.
In this context, a Caucasian male would face no difficulty in
making out a disparate impact prima facie case. That could be
achieved by establishing that members of his composite class are
282. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (Supp. IV 1992).
283. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105, 105 Stat. 1071, 1074-76
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) to -2(n) (Supp. IV 1992)).
284. l § 1074. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 restored the law of disparate impact to
-its pre-Ward's Cove state. See § 105, 105 Stat. at 1074-75 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(k) (Supp. IV 1992)). Section 105 amended 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 by adding a new
subsection, § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i), containing the quoted language. See id. The legislative
history pertaining to § 105 states in relevant part that "[t]he terms 'business necessity' and
'job related' are intended to reflect the concepts enunciated by the Supreme Court in
Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and in the other Supreme Court decisions prior to Ward's Cove
Packing Co. v. Atonio." 137 Cong. Rec. S15,276 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991) (statement of
Sen. Danforth) (citations omitted). For further discussion of the Act, see Hazen Paper Co.
v. Biggins, 113 S. Ct. 1701 (9th Cir. 1993) in which the Court stated:
'[C]laims that stress "disparate impact" [by contrast] involve employment
practices that are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that
in fact fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified by
business necessity. Proof of discriminatory motive ... is not required under a
disparate-impact theory.'
Id. at 1705 (quoting Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15); see also Atonio v. Ward's Cove
Packing Co., 10 F.3d 1485, 1491 (1993) ("[TIhe business necessity defense ... places on
the employer the burden of proving that a practice causing a disparate impact is 'job
related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity.' ").
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disproportionately (in fact, entirely) excluded from securing arbitral
review of challenged discharges under the de facto just cause standard,
while traditional protected-group members are uniformly accorded
that important due process right. Once the prima facie case is made
out, the burden shifts to the employer to prove that the practice of
denying the benefit of this implied-in-fact employment term to those
who fall outside the conventional Title VII protected groups is
warranted as a matter of business necessity.'
Such proof would be problematic for the at-will employer. It is
difficult to divine a legitimate reason, rising to the level of a business
necessity, for an at-will employer to refuse to arbitrate the discharge
cases of Caucasian males under a de facto just cause standard when
at the same time it is willing to arbitrate the discharges of nonwhites,
women, and ethnic and religious minorities under that same implied
standard. Simple assertion of a desire to retain the common law
discretion to terminate employees at-will, while rational, is not likely
to be deemed warranted as a matter of business necessity.
A court rationally could conclude that there is no defensible
justification for an employer knowingly to permit the discharges of
Caucasian males to be governed by the EAWD, denying them the
right to challenge those terminations, while Title VII protected-group
members are terminated only for just cause and afforded the right to
arbitrate discharges they believe unfair. If this were to become the
dominant judicial view, Caucasian males denied the opportunity to
arbitrate their discharges would be able to prove a Title VII violation
and secure a judicial order that the employer arbitrate all contested
discharges. Even in the event of a finding that the disparate impact
worked by an employer policy was warranted as a matter of business
necessity, Caucasian male plaintiffs could still prevail by convincing
the finder of fact that permitting all employees access to the arbitra-
tion procedure constitutes an "alternative employment practice",
286
285. The subject disparate impact claim would not focus on any particular job
classification(s) or qualification standard(s). Rather, it would center on the arbitration
procedure itself. It is difficult to characterize an arbitration mechanism as job-related or
non-job-related. Accordingly, it appears that the key inquiry at the second step of the
Title VII disparate impact analysis would be on the requirement that employment practices
with a demonstrated adverse impact be justified by business necessity.
286. Rosemary Alito, Disparate Impact Discrimination Under the 1991 Civil Rights Act,
45 RuTGERs L. REv. 1011 (1993). Professor Alito notes:
Before enactment of the 1991 Act, a disparate impact plaintiff was permitted to
rebut a successful business necessity defense by showing that there was an
alternative employment practice available which the employer refused to adopt.
A plaintiff would also have to show that the alternative practice would fulfill the
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with a less discriminatory impact (on Caucasian males) as contemplat-
ed by section 703(k)(1)(A)(ii) of Title VII.
c. A Final Concern-Section 1981
Because the preceding analysis reveals a significant potential
conflict N'ith the Title VII bar on race and color discrimination, a
parallel concern arises with regard to section 1981 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866.' As with the probability of a Title VII claim dis-
cussed earlier, an at-will employer that routinely arbitrates the
challenged discharges of traditional protected-group members should
not be surprised if Caucasian male employees who are denied the
opportunity to arbitrate their discharges bring actions under section
1981, asserting that their statutorily guaranteed equal right to contract
has been abridged.
In the previously discussed landmark reverse-discrimination
opinion in McDonald,' the Supreme Court held that section 1981
"is applicable to racial discrimination in private employment against
white persons."29  Thus, McDonald establishes that a Caucasian
does have standing to assert a race or color-based discrimination claim
under section 1981. As amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, sec-
tion 1981 now provides:
employer's business needs as well as the current practice but caused less of a
disparate impact. The employer's refusal to adopt the alternative under these
circumstances was considered as evidence that the business necessity advanced
was a pretext for discrimination.
The 1991 Act on its face appears to make this rebuttal evidence proof in and
of itself of unlawful disparate impact discrimination. It provides that a violation
is proved if a plaintiff makes a demonstration, in accordance with the pre-Ward's
Cove decisions, with respect to an alternative employment practice that the
defendant refuses to adopt. The intent of this provision is entirely unclear.
Id. at 1036-37; see also Note, The Civil Rights Act of 1991 and Less Discriminatory
Alternatives in Disparate Impact Litigation, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1621, 1625-36 (1993)
(discussing the business-necessity standard and arguing that courts should not accept cost-
based defenses to the "less discriminatory alternative" requirement).
287. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (reenacted by Enforcement Act of 1870,
ch. 114, § 18, 16 Stat. 140, 144 (1870) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1982
(1988)).
288. See supra notes 259-61 and accompanying text.
289. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 285-96 (1976) (relying on
an extensive analysis of the legislative history of section 1981); see also Evans v. McKay,
869 F.2d 1341, 1344 (9th Cir. 1989) ("Section 1981 prohibits private racial discrimination
against white person as well as against nonwhites."); Al-Kahazraji v. Saint Francis College,
784 F.2d 505, 515-18 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding that an ethnic Arab, although taxonomically
Caucasian, was nevertheless protected by section 1981 against race-motivated employment
discrimination), affd, 481 U.S. 604 (1987).
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(a) All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States
shall have the same right in every State and Territory to
make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence,
and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings
for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by
white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains,
penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to
no other.
(b) For purposes of this section, the term "make and
enforce contracts" includes the making, performance,
modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoy-
ment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the
contractual relationship.
(c) Protection against impairment: The rights protected by
this section are protected against impairment by nongovern-
mental discrimination and impairment under color of state
law.2
The 1991 amendment was prompted by the Supreme Court's opinion
in Patterson v. McClean Credit Union29 in which the Court held
that the section 1981 guarantee set forth in subsection (a) applied only
to the formation and enforcement of contracts, not to postformation
conduct.2" On its face, subsection (b) nullifies Patterson293 and
extends the protection of section 1981 to all aspects of the implemen-
tation and administration of contracts, including contracts between
employers and employees.
Applied within the context of employer-employee agreements to
arbitrate statutory FEP claims, section 1981, as amended, must be
read to require that employers ensure that the "making, performance,
modification and termination" of those contracts is race neutral and
that each employee with whom it so contracts equally enjoys "all
benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relation-
ship." Ift by contracting with their at-will employers to arbitrate
statutory FEP claims, nonwhite protected-group members also are
afforded the right to challenge all discharges under a de facto just
cause standard, it seems certain that a denial of that same collateral
right to Caucasians would give rise to potential section 1981 liability
290. 42 U.S.C §§ 1981(a)-(c) (Supp. V 1993).
291. 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
292. Id. at 175-85.
293. See Blanding v. Pennsylvania State Police, 12 F.3d 1303, 1310 (3d Cir. 1994); see
also Rodriguez v. General Motors Corp., 27 F.3d 396,397 (9th Cir. 1994) ("Section 101 of
the [1991 Civil Rights] Act, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b), explicitly rejected Patterson's
restrictive reading of § 1981.").
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for the employer. The absence of a business necessity defense under
section 1981 makes even more probable the finding of a violation of
the statute's mandate that all persons who enter into the same
contract with their employer enjoy equally its benefits.
3. Summary of the Broad Interaction Effects
The analysis above prompts the inference that at-will employers
that refuse to arbitrate the wrongful discharge claims of Caucasian
male employees, while at the same time routinely arbitrating wrongful
discharge claims brought by members of the traditional Title VII pro-
tected groups, may run afoul of the Title VII bar on race-, color-, and
sex-based employment discrimination and the section 1981 guarantee
of the equal right to contract. Thus, although at-will employers stand
a good chance of avoiding compulsion to arbitrate specious
(nonreverse discrimination) FEP claims by Caucasian males, that
victory may prove to be pyrrhic.
Although the legal theory remains speculative at this point, there
is substantial reason to believe that the legal dimensions of the third
broad interaction effect described above eventually may preclude at-
will employers from distinguishing between the discharge appeal rights
afforded traditional protected-group members and those falling
outside protected groups. It is the prospect that the decision to
arbitrate statutory FEP claims may transmute into an obligation to
arbitrate all challenged discharges under a defacto just cause standard
that creates the dilemma for at-will employers. That dilemma, the
ultimate subject of this Article, is addressed below.
VII. CONCLUSION: ARBITRATION OR THE EAWD-A HOBSON'S
CHOICE FOR AT-WILL EMPLOYERS
The analysis above demonstrates that at-will employers that
desire to continue exercising their current wide discretion to terminate
employees, while at the same time arbitrating the statutory FEP
claims of their employees, may face several unanticipated legal conse-
quences. Those legal consequences are of two types and significance.
First, there are the obvious "trip wires" awaiting the unwary at-will
employer. These are the specific interaction effects between the three
primary exceptions to the modem EAWD and employer-employee
agreements to arbitrate statutory PEP claims. The implied covenant
of good faith, the implied-in-fact contract terms/enforceable promises
doctrine, and the public policy exception demand substantial caution
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and care in both the drafting and implementation of employer-
employee agreements to arbitrate.
At-will employers that wish to take advantage of the benefits of
arbitrating FEP claims must do so with a clear understanding of the
rigor and good faith that will be required to avoid inadvertently
piercing the EAWD shield through either imprecise framing of the
arbitration mechanism, or inept or untoward administration of its
terms. Despite these substantial risks, properly motivated at-will
employers guided by competent counsel and represented by an
adequately trained supervisory and management corps have little
reason to fear that these first-level, specific interaction effects will
inadvertently expand the scope of the contemplated arbitration
procedure beyond the reach of employee statutory FEP claims. The
broader, more complex interaction effects are farther reaching and
present a more sobering proposition for at-will employers. Since
these three broad interaction effects will arise as a matter of law and
not as the result of any careless or pernicious management conduct,
at-will employers that choose to arbitrate employee statutory FEP
claims will have little control over their impact. Thus, an implied
obligation to arbitrate all challenged discharges of traditional
protected-group members will inevitably emerge, over time, from
application of the law of commercial arbitration pertaining to matters
of substantive arbitrability. This implied obligation, and the de facto
just cause standard for protected-group members inherent in the
disparate treatment order and allocation of proof paradigm, will
become apparent to at-will employers (and their employees) who
regularly arbitrate statutory FEP claims.
The impact of the third category of broad interaction effects,
those arising when at-will employers refuse to arbitrate the discharge
of Caucasian males, is less certain, but of significantly greater
potential consequence. If at-will employers that desire to arbitrate
statutory PEP claims in fact find themselves effectively obliged to
arbitrate and justify all challenged terminations of non-Caucasians,
women, ethnic and religious minority group members, the disabled,
and those over forty years of age, only Caucasian males will be left
within the effective reach of the EAWD. They alone will be without
just cause protection.
Setting aside the not insubstantial question of whether Caucasian
males would tolerate being denied the same de facto just cause
guarantee and right to challenge unfair discharges afforded their
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fellow employees,2 94 there is substantial reason to doubt the legality
under Title VII and section 1981 of an employment policy that draws
such a distinction in employment conditions on the basis of employ-
ees' race, color, national origin, and gender. Of the three possible
lines of legal analysis that eventually could preclude at-will employers
from refusing to arbitrate challenges to discharge brought by
terminated Caucasian males-Title VII disparate treatment theory,
Title VII disparate impact theory, and section 1981 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866-the Title VII disparate impact and section 1981 theories
are the most plausible. The danger of violating Title VII and section
1981 can be disregarded only if one accepts the premise that the
protections of those two statutes are not sufficiently elastic to embrace
the discrimination claims of discharged Caucasian males denied the
right to challenge their terminations through arbitration. At-will
employers cannot rely upon this dubious proposition.
The message for at-will employers is clear. The price for securing
the benefits of arbitrating statutory FEP claims may prove to be a
partial or total surrender of the EAWD shield. At-will employers
that adopt the binding arbitration device as the vehicle for adjudicat-
ing the statutory FEP claims of their employees must do so with full
knowledge of the risk inherent in taking that step. At the very least,
at-will employers that choose to arbitrate statutory FEP claims will be
compelled to arbitrate and defend, under a de facto just cause
standard, all challenged discharges of traditional FEP protected-group
members. If the third category of broad interaction effects conceptu-
alized by the authors materializes, at-will employers will be forced to
arbitrate and defend the challenged discharges of all employees,
protected and nonprotected-group members alike, thereby evis-
cerating the EAWD completely. Therefore, at-will employers
choosing to arbitrate statutory FEP claims must be at least implicitly
294. Even though this analysis is focused on the legal dimensions of arbitrating
statutory FEP claims, the most serious impediment to at-will employers refusing to
arbitrate only the challenged discharges of nonprotected-group members may well be
illegal. It emerges from the strong likelihood that Caucasian males under the age of 40
who are not disabled simply will not tolerate being left subject to the employer's unbridled
discretion to discharge them for any reason or no reason when their protected-group peers
are not. The potential for serious workplace turmoil presented by the perceived unfairness
of such a bifurcated due process regime are so apparent as not to require elucidation. The
prospect of that disruption and its impact on worker morale and productivity may, in itself,
be sufficient motivation for at-will employers that desire to arbitrate statutory FEP claims
to forego any attempt to limit the reach of the de facto just cause guarantee and the
arbitration mechanism only to protected-group members.
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willing to relinquish the remaining vestiges of the EAWD and
embrace a just cause standard that applies to all of their employees.
This phenomenon, the voluntary closing of the circle of fair
employment rights by extending just cause protection to Caucasian
males, is the logical, unsurprising end result of the tacit decision by
Congress not to legislate fair treatment in the workplace for all, but
instead only to protect the. equal employment opportunity rights of
certain insular groups. If the increasing diversity of the American
work force has not already led to the establishment of a recognizable
de facto guarantee of just cause for the majority of American workers
pursuant to the disparate treatment order and allocation of proof
paradigm, it soon will. That reality, and the problematic nature of an
employment policy that in operation denies only Caucasian males just
cause protection and the right to challenge their discharges through
arbitration might motivate at-will employers to reevaluate the true
residual utility of the EAWD. Undoubtedly, moving away from the
long-coveted discretion granted them by Wood's Rule would prove a
difficult task for many at-will employers. Nevertheless, at-will
employers might conclude that the downside of surrendering what
remains of the EAWD is actually outweighed by the gains to be
realized by arbitrating statutory FEP and non-FEP wrongful discharge
claims.
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